Achieving a direct matching by the gvmt (even if it would be only with, say, a +25% match-factor or so, to keep it roughly in line with what tax-deductability means), instead of tax deductability, could indeed be more just, removing the bias you mention that unnecessarily favors the rich. Spot on imho.
That said, democracies seem to love “tax deductability”: stealing from the state that feels a bit less like stealing. So, deductability can be the single mostly easily acceptable policy. If so, it might pragmatically be worthwhile to support it, despite the negative redistributional consequence just mentioned.
The best action might be to try to set up local EA charities that can easily get certified for tax deductability in Belgium, and use the money either directly to support the intl EA organizations, or, if that is difficult, then in the worst case simply to support similar work in parallel (?).
Mostly independently of 1. vs. 2., whether the (donation elasticity-adjusted) average donation is more effective than gvmt tax collection (or reducing standard gvmt tax burden*), feels difficult to say, and will depend a lot on how much you value different types of social goods. Atm, most donations will not be EA type donations, but one might expect people to give to causes often significantly better than for tax revenues, so I’d personally rather err towards the pro-deduct (or pro-match) side so far.
*It would be wrong to consider only ‘tax revenue lost’ for the gvmt as effect of the tax deductability. In expectation, in a simple model, gvmt will in the medium term partly respond with (i) lower expenditures, and (ii) increase standard tax rates in response to higher tax deductions.
Btw, I personally would not worry about the €25 threshold. Avoiding to register/count too small sums seems a reasonable thing, even if you’re right that it becomes less relevant in the digital world.
Great question!
Achieving a direct matching by the gvmt (even if it would be only with, say, a +25% match-factor or so, to keep it roughly in line with what tax-deductability means), instead of tax deductability, could indeed be more just, removing the bias you mention that unnecessarily favors the rich. Spot on imho.
That said, democracies seem to love “tax deductability”: stealing from the state that feels a bit less like stealing. So, deductability can be the single mostly easily acceptable policy. If so, it might pragmatically be worthwhile to support it, despite the negative redistributional consequence just mentioned.
The best action might be to try to set up local EA charities that can easily get certified for tax deductability in Belgium, and use the money either directly to support the intl EA organizations, or, if that is difficult, then in the worst case simply to support similar work in parallel (?).
Mostly independently of 1. vs. 2., whether the (donation elasticity-adjusted) average donation is more effective than gvmt tax collection (or reducing standard gvmt tax burden*), feels difficult to say, and will depend a lot on how much you value different types of social goods. Atm, most donations will not be EA type donations, but one might expect people to give to causes often significantly better than for tax revenues, so I’d personally rather err towards the pro-deduct (or pro-match) side so far.
*It would be wrong to consider only ‘tax revenue lost’ for the gvmt as effect of the tax deductability. In expectation, in a simple model, gvmt will in the medium term partly respond with (i) lower expenditures, and (ii) increase standard tax rates in response to higher tax deductions.
Btw, I personally would not worry about the €25 threshold. Avoiding to register/count too small sums seems a reasonable thing, even if you’re right that it becomes less relevant in the digital world.