Thanks for the post. I doubt the length is a problem. As long as you’re willing to produce quality analysis, my guess is that most of the people on this forum would be happy to read it.
My thoughts are that destruction of ecosystems is not justifiable especially because many of its effects are probably irreversible (e.g. extinction of some species), and because there is huge uncertainty about its impact. The uncertainty arises because of the points you make, and because of the shakiness of even some of the assumptions you use such as the hedonistic framework. (For example, in humans the distinction between the “experiencing” and “remembering” selves diminishes the value of this framework, and we don’t know the extent to which it applies to animals.) Additional uncertainty also exists because we do not know what technological capabilities we might have in the future to reduce wild animal suffering. So almost regardless of the specifics, I believe that it would certainly be better to wait at least until we know more about animal suffering and humanity’s future capabilities, before seriously considering taking the irreversible and drastic measure of destroying habitats. This might be just a different point of emphasis rather than something you didn’t cover.
Yeah, I totally agree. The scope of what I was talking about was more limited. If there were clearly net WAS, we’d have to weigh up the apparent benefits of ecosystem destruction (i.e. less animal misery) against the sort of costs you’re taking about.
My aim was to challenge the argument about their being net WAS. Unless there is net WAS (or you’re a negative utilitarian) the case for habitat destruction looks pretty thin anyway.
FWIW, I don’t think their being experienced vs remembered selves is a problematic for a hedonic framework. In fact that distinctly requires the assumption people do feel things and can rate how bad it is, and those can then be compared to their memories. That stuff is a problem for our ability to make good affective forecasts (which I admit we suck at).
Ah, you’re right about the hedonistic framework. On re-reading your intro I think I meant the idea of using pleasure as a synonym for happiness and taking pain and suffering as synonyms for unhappiness. This, combined with the idea of counting minutes of pleasure vs. pain, seems to focus on just the experiencing self.
Thanks for the post. I doubt the length is a problem. As long as you’re willing to produce quality analysis, my guess is that most of the people on this forum would be happy to read it.
My thoughts are that destruction of ecosystems is not justifiable especially because many of its effects are probably irreversible (e.g. extinction of some species), and because there is huge uncertainty about its impact. The uncertainty arises because of the points you make, and because of the shakiness of even some of the assumptions you use such as the hedonistic framework. (For example, in humans the distinction between the “experiencing” and “remembering” selves diminishes the value of this framework, and we don’t know the extent to which it applies to animals.) Additional uncertainty also exists because we do not know what technological capabilities we might have in the future to reduce wild animal suffering. So almost regardless of the specifics, I believe that it would certainly be better to wait at least until we know more about animal suffering and humanity’s future capabilities, before seriously considering taking the irreversible and drastic measure of destroying habitats. This might be just a different point of emphasis rather than something you didn’t cover.
Hello Michael,
Yeah, I totally agree. The scope of what I was talking about was more limited. If there were clearly net WAS, we’d have to weigh up the apparent benefits of ecosystem destruction (i.e. less animal misery) against the sort of costs you’re taking about.
My aim was to challenge the argument about their being net WAS. Unless there is net WAS (or you’re a negative utilitarian) the case for habitat destruction looks pretty thin anyway.
FWIW, I don’t think their being experienced vs remembered selves is a problematic for a hedonic framework. In fact that distinctly requires the assumption people do feel things and can rate how bad it is, and those can then be compared to their memories. That stuff is a problem for our ability to make good affective forecasts (which I admit we suck at).
Ah, you’re right about the hedonistic framework. On re-reading your intro I think I meant the idea of using pleasure as a synonym for happiness and taking pain and suffering as synonyms for unhappiness. This, combined with the idea of counting minutes of pleasure vs. pain, seems to focus on just the experiencing self.