Thanks Jason, mostly agree with paras 4-5, and think para 2 is a good point as well.
Do you think the neutral point and basic philosophical perspective (e.g., deprivationism vs. epicureanism) are empirical questions, or are they matters on which the donor has to exercise their own moral and philosophical judgment (after considering what the somewhat limited survey data have to say on the topic)?
I think the basic philosophical perspective is a moral/âphilosophical judgement. But the neutral point combines that moral judgement with empirical models of what peoplesâ lives are actually like, and empirical beliefs about how people respond to surveys.
I wonder if, insofar as we do have different perspectives on this (and I donât think weâre particularly far apart, particularly on the object level question), the crux is around how much weight to put in individual donor judgement? Or even how much individual donors have those judgements?
My experience of even EA-minded (or at least GiveWell) donors is that ~none of them have a position on these kinds of questions, and they actively want to defer. My (less confident but based on quite a few conversations) model of EA-minded StrongMinds donors is they want to give to mental health and see an EA-approved charity so give there, rather than because of a quantitative belief on foundational questions like the neutral point. As an aside, I believe that was how StrongMinds first got on EAâs radarâas a recommendation for Founders Pledge donors who specifically wanted to give to mental health in an evidence-based way.
It does seem plausible to me that donors who follow HLI recommendations (who I expect are particularly philosophically minded) would be more willing to change their decisions based on these kinds of questions than donors Iâve talked to.
Iâd be interested if someone wanted to stick up for a neutral point of 3 as something they actually believe and a crux for where they give, rather than something someone could believe, or is plausible. I could be wrong, but Iâm starting out skeptical that belief would survive contact with âBut that implies the world would be better if everyone in Afghanistan diedâ and âa representative survey of people whose deaths youâd be preventing think their lives are more valuable than thatâ
From HLIâs perspective, it makes sense to describe how the moral/âphilosophical views one assumes affect the relative effectiveness of charities. They are, after all, a charity recommender, and donors are their âclientsâ in a sense. GiveWell doesnât really do this, which makes senseâGiveWellâs moral weights are so weighted toward saving lives that it doesnât really make sense for them to investigate charities with other modes of action. I think itâs fine to provide a bottom-line recommendation on whatever moral/âphilosophical view a recommender feels is best-supported, but itâs hardly obligatory.
We recognize donor preferences in that we donât create a grand theory of effectiveness and push everyone to donate to longtermist organizations, or animal-welfare organizations, or global health organizations depending on the grand theoryâs output. Donors choose among these for their own idiosyncratic reasons, but moral/âphilosophical views are certainly among the critical criteria for many donors. I donât see why that shouldnât be the case for interventions within a cause area that produce different kinds of outputs as well.
Here, I doubt most global-health donorsâeither those who take advice from GiveWell or from HLIâhave finely-tuned views on deprivationism, neutral points, and so on. However, I think many donors do have preferences that indirectly track on some of those issues. For instance, you describe a class of donors who âwant to give to mental health.â While there could be various reasons for that, itâs plausible to me that these donors place more of an emphasis on improving experience for those who are alive (e.g., they give partial credence to epicureanism) and/âor on alleviating suffering. If they did assess and chart their views on neutral point and philosophical view, I would expect them to end up more often at points where SM is ranked relatively higher than the average global-health donor would. But that is just conjecture on my part.
One interesting aspect of thinking from the donor perspective is the possibility that survey results could be significantly affected by religious beliefs. If many respondents chose a 0 neutral point because their religious tradition led them to that conclusion, and you are quite convinced that the religious tradition is just wrong in general, do you adjust for that? Does not adjusting allow the religious tradition to indirectly influence where you spend your charitable dollar?
To me, the most important thing a charity evaluator/ârecommender does is clearly communicate what the donation accomplishes (on average) if given to various organizations they identifyâX lives saved (and smaller benefits), or Y number of peopleâs well-being improved by Z amount. Thatâs the part the donor canât do themselves (without investing a ton of time and resources).
I donât think the neutral point is as high as 3. But I think itâs fine for HLI to offer recommendations for people who do.
Thanks Jason, mostly agree with paras 4-5, and think para 2 is a good point as well.
I think the basic philosophical perspective is a moral/âphilosophical judgement. But the neutral point combines that moral judgement with empirical models of what peoplesâ lives are actually like, and empirical beliefs about how people respond to surveys.
I wonder if, insofar as we do have different perspectives on this (and I donât think weâre particularly far apart, particularly on the object level question), the crux is around how much weight to put in individual donor judgement? Or even how much individual donors have those judgements?
My experience of even EA-minded (or at least GiveWell) donors is that ~none of them have a position on these kinds of questions, and they actively want to defer. My (less confident but based on quite a few conversations) model of EA-minded StrongMinds donors is they want to give to mental health and see an EA-approved charity so give there, rather than because of a quantitative belief on foundational questions like the neutral point. As an aside, I believe that was how StrongMinds first got on EAâs radarâas a recommendation for Founders Pledge donors who specifically wanted to give to mental health in an evidence-based way.
It does seem plausible to me that donors who follow HLI recommendations (who I expect are particularly philosophically minded) would be more willing to change their decisions based on these kinds of questions than donors Iâve talked to.
Iâd be interested if someone wanted to stick up for a neutral point of 3 as something they actually believe and a crux for where they give, rather than something someone could believe, or is plausible. I could be wrong, but Iâm starting out skeptical that belief would survive contact with âBut that implies the world would be better if everyone in Afghanistan diedâ and âa representative survey of people whose deaths youâd be preventing think their lives are more valuable than thatâ
What do you think?
From HLIâs perspective, it makes sense to describe how the moral/âphilosophical views one assumes affect the relative effectiveness of charities. They are, after all, a charity recommender, and donors are their âclientsâ in a sense. GiveWell doesnât really do this, which makes senseâGiveWellâs moral weights are so weighted toward saving lives that it doesnât really make sense for them to investigate charities with other modes of action. I think itâs fine to provide a bottom-line recommendation on whatever moral/âphilosophical view a recommender feels is best-supported, but itâs hardly obligatory.
We recognize donor preferences in that we donât create a grand theory of effectiveness and push everyone to donate to longtermist organizations, or animal-welfare organizations, or global health organizations depending on the grand theoryâs output. Donors choose among these for their own idiosyncratic reasons, but moral/âphilosophical views are certainly among the critical criteria for many donors. I donât see why that shouldnât be the case for interventions within a cause area that produce different kinds of outputs as well.
Here, I doubt most global-health donorsâeither those who take advice from GiveWell or from HLIâhave finely-tuned views on deprivationism, neutral points, and so on. However, I think many donors do have preferences that indirectly track on some of those issues. For instance, you describe a class of donors who âwant to give to mental health.â While there could be various reasons for that, itâs plausible to me that these donors place more of an emphasis on improving experience for those who are alive (e.g., they give partial credence to epicureanism) and/âor on alleviating suffering. If they did assess and chart their views on neutral point and philosophical view, I would expect them to end up more often at points where SM is ranked relatively higher than the average global-health donor would. But that is just conjecture on my part.
One interesting aspect of thinking from the donor perspective is the possibility that survey results could be significantly affected by religious beliefs. If many respondents chose a 0 neutral point because their religious tradition led them to that conclusion, and you are quite convinced that the religious tradition is just wrong in general, do you adjust for that? Does not adjusting allow the religious tradition to indirectly influence where you spend your charitable dollar?
To me, the most important thing a charity evaluator/ârecommender does is clearly communicate what the donation accomplishes (on average) if given to various organizations they identifyâX lives saved (and smaller benefits), or Y number of peopleâs well-being improved by Z amount. Thatâs the part the donor canât do themselves (without investing a ton of time and resources).
I donât think the neutral point is as high as 3. But I think itâs fine for HLI to offer recommendations for people who do.