This is a great post. Your stories on Jayantha Dhanapala, Franklin Miller, Roberta Wohlstetter, and Joan Rohlfing are particularly helpful in illustrating unique theories of change.
On “What goals should we be aiming towards?” I recommend that people enter the field without specific goals until they better understand the field and its recurring debates. Focusing on a broader aim—like reducing the risks and consequences of nuclear war—is great because it keeps you mentally flexible. You’re not tied down to the preferences of the primacist, arms control, or disarmament communities.
This is important because nuclear experts often disagree on what polices are stabilizing or destabilizing. For example, in that same section, you write:
Prevent deployment of the most escalatory weapons. For example, in early 2023, the US decided not to develop a new nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N). SLCM-Ns are considered destabilising because of their target and payload ambiguity, so this decision was a substantial success for risk-reduction. Similarly, there may be policies that could disincentivize Russia and China from deploying some of the destabilising weapons they are currently pursuing.
Yet Rob Soofer, Heather Williams, and other nuclear scholars would argue that the SLCM-N is stabilizing because it deters Russian use of low-yield (aka “non-strategic”) nuclear weapon. Satisfying that mission may outweigh the possible drawbacks on target and payload ambiguity.
This is a great post. Your stories on Jayantha Dhanapala, Franklin Miller, Roberta Wohlstetter, and Joan Rohlfing are particularly helpful in illustrating unique theories of change.
On “What goals should we be aiming towards?” I recommend that people enter the field without specific goals until they better understand the field and its recurring debates. Focusing on a broader aim—like reducing the risks and consequences of nuclear war—is great because it keeps you mentally flexible. You’re not tied down to the preferences of the primacist, arms control, or disarmament communities.
This is important because nuclear experts often disagree on what polices are stabilizing or destabilizing. For example, in that same section, you write:
Yet Rob Soofer, Heather Williams, and other nuclear scholars would argue that the SLCM-N is stabilizing because it deters Russian use of low-yield (aka “non-strategic”) nuclear weapon. Satisfying that mission may outweigh the possible drawbacks on target and payload ambiguity.