I am very strongly attached to both dominance addition and non-anti-egalitarianism. If I was to reject a premise it would probably be transitivity, though I think there are very strong structural reasons to accept transitivity, as well as modestly strong principled ones (in all cases of intransitive values I am aware of, the thing you care about in a world depends on what other world it is being compared to, if this is necessarily the case for intransitive values, it requires a sort of extrinsic valuation that I am very averse to, and which is crucial to my strong acceptance of dominance addition as well).
A more realistic way I reject the repugnant conclusion in practice is on a non-ethical level. I don’t think that my aversion to the repugnant conclusion (actually not nearly as strong as my aversion to other principled results of my preferred views, like those of pure aggregation) is sensitive to strong moral reasons at all. I think that rejection of many of these implications, for me, is more part of a different sort of project all together from principled ethics. I don’t believe I can be persuaded of these conclusions by even the best principled arguments, and so I don’t think there is any level on which I arrived at them because of such principles either.
I think many people find views like this to be a sort of cop-out, but I think arriving at moral rules in a way that more resembles running linear regressions on case-specific intuitions degrades an honest appreciation for both moral principles and my own psychology, I see no reason to expect there to be a sufficiently comfortable convergence between the best versions of the two.
I am very strongly attached to both dominance addition and non-anti-egalitarianism. If I was to reject a premise it would probably be transitivity, though I think there are very strong structural reasons to accept transitivity, as well as modestly strong principled ones (in all cases of intransitive values I am aware of, the thing you care about in a world depends on what other world it is being compared to, if this is necessarily the case for intransitive values, it requires a sort of extrinsic valuation that I am very averse to, and which is crucial to my strong acceptance of dominance addition as well).
A more realistic way I reject the repugnant conclusion in practice is on a non-ethical level. I don’t think that my aversion to the repugnant conclusion (actually not nearly as strong as my aversion to other principled results of my preferred views, like those of pure aggregation) is sensitive to strong moral reasons at all. I think that rejection of many of these implications, for me, is more part of a different sort of project all together from principled ethics. I don’t believe I can be persuaded of these conclusions by even the best principled arguments, and so I don’t think there is any level on which I arrived at them because of such principles either.
I think many people find views like this to be a sort of cop-out, but I think arriving at moral rules in a way that more resembles running linear regressions on case-specific intuitions degrades an honest appreciation for both moral principles and my own psychology, I see no reason to expect there to be a sufficiently comfortable convergence between the best versions of the two.