Re 2: I don’t think the standard issues with pure aggregation can be appealed to in the strongest version of non-anti-egalitarianism, because you can add arbitrarily many steps so that in each step the pool of beneficiaries and harmed are equal in size, and the per individual stakes of the beneficiaries is greater. Transitivity generally does imply pure aggregation for reasons like this, so it seems like in this case you’d want to deny transitivity (or again, IIA) instead, or else you’ll need to make a stronger and apparently costlier claim about how to trade off interests that isn’t unique to pure aggregation.
Interesting! That argument seems right, if you rule out positive value lexicality, so that you can guarantee the beneficiaries can gain more than the harmed lose, and this can all be done in finitely many steps.
Re 2: I don’t think the standard issues with pure aggregation can be appealed to in the strongest version of non-anti-egalitarianism, because you can add arbitrarily many steps so that in each step the pool of beneficiaries and harmed are equal in size, and the per individual stakes of the beneficiaries is greater. Transitivity generally does imply pure aggregation for reasons like this, so it seems like in this case you’d want to deny transitivity (or again, IIA) instead, or else you’ll need to make a stronger and apparently costlier claim about how to trade off interests that isn’t unique to pure aggregation.
Interesting! That argument seems right, if you rule out positive value lexicality, so that you can guarantee the beneficiaries can gain more than the harmed lose, and this can all be done in finitely many steps.
Sorry yeah, that was an unstated assumption of mine as well.