Great piece! This connects directly to something Iâve been thinking about in my recent post on âorthogonal impact.â The key insight isnât just that government roles have impactâitâs that they often have the most impact through levers that arenât measured or incentivized by the job itself.
Consider the contrast: if you work at GiveWell or an EA-aligned charity, your performance metrics likely align with doing good. The counterfactual person whoâd take your job would also be trying to maximize impactâthatâs literally what theyâre paid to do. But in government (or corporations, academia, etc.), the situation is different. A USDA official is evaluated on processing efficiency and regulatory compliance, not on whether they quietly shifted procurement standards to help millions of animals. A congressional staffer gets promoted for serving their boss well, not for adding crucial language to obscure bills that could save lives.
This misalignment between job incentives and impact opportunities is exactly what creates the leverage. The counterfactual government employee would likely focus on what gets measuredâhitting their KPIs, avoiding controversy, climbing the ladder. They wouldnât spend political capital pushing for open data standards or championing unglamorous but vital legislation. These orthogonal opportunities for good sit neglected precisely because they donât help anyoneâs career.
Your point about government being âessential infrastructure for EA goalsâ is spot-on. We need people willing to occupy these positions and utilize both the official powers AND the unmeasured discretionary opportunities they contain.
Great piece! This connects directly to something Iâve been thinking about in my recent post on âorthogonal impact.â The key insight isnât just that government roles have impactâitâs that they often have the most impact through levers that arenât measured or incentivized by the job itself.
Consider the contrast: if you work at GiveWell or an EA-aligned charity, your performance metrics likely align with doing good. The counterfactual person whoâd take your job would also be trying to maximize impactâthatâs literally what theyâre paid to do. But in government (or corporations, academia, etc.), the situation is different. A USDA official is evaluated on processing efficiency and regulatory compliance, not on whether they quietly shifted procurement standards to help millions of animals. A congressional staffer gets promoted for serving their boss well, not for adding crucial language to obscure bills that could save lives.
This misalignment between job incentives and impact opportunities is exactly what creates the leverage. The counterfactual government employee would likely focus on what gets measuredâhitting their KPIs, avoiding controversy, climbing the ladder. They wouldnât spend political capital pushing for open data standards or championing unglamorous but vital legislation. These orthogonal opportunities for good sit neglected precisely because they donât help anyoneâs career.
Your point about government being âessential infrastructure for EA goalsâ is spot-on. We need people willing to occupy these positions and utilize both the official powers AND the unmeasured discretionary opportunities they contain.