So let’s view from the individual’s perspective. I think looking at that perspective reveals a fundamental difference in the types of value we’re comparing. The analogy breaks down because it incorrectly assumes that the value of money and the value of lives are structured in the same way.
1. The Non-Linear Utility of Money (The Insurance Case)
For an individual, money has non-linear utility. The first $1000 you earn is life-changing, while an extra $1000 when you’re a millionaire is not.
Losing your last dollar is catastrophic—a state of ruin. Therefore, it is perfectly rational to pay a small premium, which represents a tiny certain loss of your least valuable money, to prevent a small chance of a catastrophic loss of your most valuable money. The insurance decision is rational precisely because of this non-linear value.
2. The Linear Value of Saving Lives (The EA Dilemma)
In contrast, the moral value of saving lives is treated as linear in these calculations. The first life saved is just as valuable as the 1000th. There is no “diminishing return” on a human life.
Because the value is linear, we don’t need to worry about utility curves. We can compare the outcomes directly. My argument is that when comparing these linear values, a guaranteed outcome (saving 1 life) is rationally preferable to an action with a 99.9% chance of achieving nothing.
The insurance analogy relies on the non-linear utility of money to be persuasive. Since that feature doesn’t exist in our dilemma about saving lives, the analogy is flawed and doesn’t challenge the original point.
So let’s view from the individual’s perspective. I think looking at that perspective reveals a fundamental difference in the types of value we’re comparing. The analogy breaks down because it incorrectly assumes that the value of money and the value of lives are structured in the same way.
1. The Non-Linear Utility of Money (The Insurance Case)
For an individual, money has non-linear utility. The first $1000 you earn is life-changing, while an extra $1000 when you’re a millionaire is not.
Losing your last dollar is catastrophic—a state of ruin. Therefore, it is perfectly rational to pay a small premium, which represents a tiny certain loss of your least valuable money, to prevent a small chance of a catastrophic loss of your most valuable money. The insurance decision is rational precisely because of this non-linear value.
2. The Linear Value of Saving Lives (The EA Dilemma)
In contrast, the moral value of saving lives is treated as linear in these calculations. The first life saved is just as valuable as the 1000th. There is no “diminishing return” on a human life.
Because the value is linear, we don’t need to worry about utility curves. We can compare the outcomes directly. My argument is that when comparing these linear values, a guaranteed outcome (saving 1 life) is rationally preferable to an action with a 99.9% chance of achieving nothing.
The insurance analogy relies on the non-linear utility of money to be persuasive. Since that feature doesn’t exist in our dilemma about saving lives, the analogy is flawed and doesn’t challenge the original point.