I think this argument conflates the fact that p, and people’s belief that p. Consider these two principles
1. If people correctly believe that going on the protests produces more good than harm, then they should go on the protests.
2. If people believe that going on the protests produces more good than harm, then they should go on the protests.
Principle 1 seems to me clearly correct from a utilitarian point of view. Principle 2 is absurd—people can have mad and false beliefs. If someone believes that going on a neo-nazi rally is going to produce greater marginal benefits than staying at home, that doesn’t mean that they should in fact break the lockdown. The proposition “The BLM protests will produce more good than harm” doesn’t entail principle 2.
(I’m not saying that the protests do in fact produce more good than harm, I’m just criticising Larks’ counter-argument in the above comment)
I think this argument conflates the fact that p, and people’s belief that p. Consider these two principles
1. If people correctly believe that going on the protests produces more good than harm, then they should go on the protests.
2. If people believe that going on the protests produces more good than harm, then they should go on the protests.
Principle 1 seems to me clearly correct from a utilitarian point of view. Principle 2 is absurd—people can have mad and false beliefs. If someone believes that going on a neo-nazi rally is going to produce greater marginal benefits than staying at home, that doesn’t mean that they should in fact break the lockdown. The proposition “The BLM protests will produce more good than harm” doesn’t entail principle 2.
(I’m not saying that the protests do in fact produce more good than harm, I’m just criticising Larks’ counter-argument in the above comment)