Ah, I understand now. Certainly then there is ambiguity that needs to be sorted out. I’d like to say again that this is not something the original theory was designed to handle. Everything I’ve been saying in these comments is off the cuff rather than premeditated—it’s not surprising that there are flaws in the fixes I’ve suggested. It’s certainly not surprising that the ad hoc fixes don’t solve every conceivable problem. And again, it would appear to me that there are plenty of plausible solutions. I guess really that I just need to spend some time evaluating which would be best and then tidy it up in a new post.
“No, they wouldn’t, because the people in (B) are different to the people in (C). You can assert that you treat them the same, but you can’t assert that they are the same. The (B) scenario with different people and the (B) scenario with the same people are both distinct, possible, outcomes, and your theory needs to handle them both. It can give the same answer to both, that’s fine, but part of the set up of my hypothetical scenario is that the people are different.”
Then yes, as I did say in the rather lengthy explanation I gave:
“The route of disappearing 1000 people and replacing them with 1000 new people is one of the worse routes.”
If you insist that we must get rid of 1000 people and replace them with 1000 different people, then sure, (B) is worse than (C). So now I will remind myself what your objection regarding this was in an earlier comment.
I’ll try explaining again briefly. With this theory, don’t think of the (B),(C) etc. as populations but rather as “distributions” the status quo population could take. Thus, as I said:
“(B) is a hypothetical which may be achieved by any route. Whether the resulting people of (B) in the hypothetical are real or imaginary depends on which route you take.”
When a population is not the status quo, it is simply representing a population distribution that you can get to. Whichever population is not the status quo is considered in an abstract, hypothetical sense.
Now you wish to specifically consider the case where (with status quo (C)), everyone in (B) is specified to be different to the people in (C). I stress that this is not the usual sense in which comparisons are made in the theory; it is much more specific. Again, if one insists on this, then since we have to disappear 1000 people to get to (B), (B) is worse.
Your issue with this is that: “the people in (B) would not want to move to (C), and vice versa, because that would mean they no longer exist. But your theory now gives a strong recommendation for one over the other anyway.”
Now I hope the explanation is fully clear. The distribution of (B) is preferable to people in (C) (i.e. with (C) as the status quo), but if you insist that the only routes to (C) involve getting rid of most of the population and replacing them with 1000 non-identical people, then this is not preferable. When (A) is the status quo, yes, we have a strong preference for (B) over (C) because we don’t have to lose 1000 people, and I don’t see the problem with considering people with equal welfare who (in the status quo of (A)) are imaginary or “effectively real” as identical. In line with a person-affecting outlook, I give more priority to real people than imaginary or effectively real people—I only respect the non-identity of real people. And just to add, viewing people as effectively real is not to say that they are really real (since they don’t exist yet, even if they are mathematically expected to); it’s only been a way to balance the books for forced decisions.
The outcome is still, as far as I can see, consistent with transitivity and my already-avowed rejection of an objective ordering.
“Let me give a more concrete example.”
Ah, I understand now. Certainly then there is ambiguity that needs to be sorted out. I’d like to say again that this is not something the original theory was designed to handle. Everything I’ve been saying in these comments is off the cuff rather than premeditated—it’s not surprising that there are flaws in the fixes I’ve suggested. It’s certainly not surprising that the ad hoc fixes don’t solve every conceivable problem. And again, it would appear to me that there are plenty of plausible solutions. I guess really that I just need to spend some time evaluating which would be best and then tidy it up in a new post.
“No, they wouldn’t, because the people in (B) are different to the people in (C). You can assert that you treat them the same, but you can’t assert that they are the same. The (B) scenario with different people and the (B) scenario with the same people are both distinct, possible, outcomes, and your theory needs to handle them both. It can give the same answer to both, that’s fine, but part of the set up of my hypothetical scenario is that the people are different.”
Then yes, as I did say in the rather lengthy explanation I gave:
“The route of disappearing 1000 people and replacing them with 1000 new people is one of the worse routes.”
If you insist that we must get rid of 1000 people and replace them with 1000 different people, then sure, (B) is worse than (C). So now I will remind myself what your objection regarding this was in an earlier comment.
I’ll try explaining again briefly. With this theory, don’t think of the (B),(C) etc. as populations but rather as “distributions” the status quo population could take. Thus, as I said:
“(B) is a hypothetical which may be achieved by any route. Whether the resulting people of (B) in the hypothetical are real or imaginary depends on which route you take.”
When a population is not the status quo, it is simply representing a population distribution that you can get to. Whichever population is not the status quo is considered in an abstract, hypothetical sense.
Now you wish to specifically consider the case where (with status quo (C)), everyone in (B) is specified to be different to the people in (C). I stress that this is not the usual sense in which comparisons are made in the theory; it is much more specific. Again, if one insists on this, then since we have to disappear 1000 people to get to (B), (B) is worse.
Your issue with this is that: “the people in (B) would not want to move to (C), and vice versa, because that would mean they no longer exist. But your theory now gives a strong recommendation for one over the other anyway.”
Now I hope the explanation is fully clear. The distribution of (B) is preferable to people in (C) (i.e. with (C) as the status quo), but if you insist that the only routes to (C) involve getting rid of most of the population and replacing them with 1000 non-identical people, then this is not preferable. When (A) is the status quo, yes, we have a strong preference for (B) over (C) because we don’t have to lose 1000 people, and I don’t see the problem with considering people with equal welfare who (in the status quo of (A)) are imaginary or “effectively real” as identical. In line with a person-affecting outlook, I give more priority to real people than imaginary or effectively real people—I only respect the non-identity of real people. And just to add, viewing people as effectively real is not to say that they are really real (since they don’t exist yet, even if they are mathematically expected to); it’s only been a way to balance the books for forced decisions.
The outcome is still, as far as I can see, consistent with transitivity and my already-avowed rejection of an objective ordering.