I think there may be two separate actions to analyze here: the decisions to take extreme risks with FTX/Alameda’s own assets to start with, and the decision to convert customer funds in an attempt to prevent Alameda, FTT , FTX, SBF, and the Future Fund from collapsing in that order.
If that is true, it isnt an answer to say SBF shouldn’t have been taking extreme risks with a huge fraction of EA aligned money. At the time the fraud / no fraud decision was to be made, that may no longer have been an option.
So EA needs to be clear on whether SBF should have allowed his wealth / much of the EA Treasury to collapse rather than risk/convert customer funds, because that may have been the choice he was faced with a week ago.
I think there may be two separate actions to analyze here: the decisions to take extreme risks with FTX/Alameda’s own assets to start with, and the decision to convert customer funds in an attempt to prevent Alameda, FTT , FTX, SBF, and the Future Fund from collapsing in that order.
If that is true, it isnt an answer to say SBF shouldn’t have been taking extreme risks with a huge fraction of EA aligned money. At the time the fraud / no fraud decision was to be made, that may no longer have been an option.
So EA needs to be clear on whether SBF should have allowed his wealth / much of the EA Treasury to collapse rather than risk/convert customer funds, because that may have been the choice he was faced with a week ago.