If a long future is not plausible, a uniform prior of hingy-ness makes sense even when considering the non-negligible amounts of x-risk we seem to observe now.
It also offers an explanation for us being in an ‘early’ time, there is no later time we could have been born in. In other words, humanity doesn’t have much time left so being born a long time into the future is the implausible bit.
Shouldn’t this doomsday argument have a higher prior probability than a sudden decline in x-risk or simulation? We’ve seen extinction events happen before, but not the other two.
If a long future is not plausible, a uniform prior of hingy-ness makes sense even when considering the non-negligible amounts of x-risk we seem to observe now.
It also offers an explanation for us being in an ‘early’ time, there is no later time we could have been born in. In other words, humanity doesn’t have much time left so being born a long time into the future is the implausible bit.
Shouldn’t this doomsday argument have a higher prior probability than a sudden decline in x-risk or simulation? We’ve seen extinction events happen before, but not the other two.