this is different from quantum multiverse splitting, as this splitting happens just prior to the Big Bang itself, causing the Big Bang to occur, essentially causing new, distinct bubble universes to form which are completely physically separate from each other, with it being impossible to causally influence any of the younger universes using any known physics as far as I am aware.
to paraphrase what i think you mean: “new universes are eternally coming into existence at an exponentially increasing rate, and where no universes can be causally influenced by actions in other ones”. in that case:
because they’re all causally separated, we can ignore which are newer or older and just model the portions between them.
(it’s true that most copies of us would exist in later universes)
given causal separateness: apart from acausal trade, the best action is the same as if there were only one world: to focus on the long term (of that single universe).
(considerations related to acausal trade and infinite universe amount in footnote)[1]
i don’t see where this implies ultimate-neartermism. below i’ll write where i think your reasoning went wrong, if i understood it correctly. (edit: i read hans’ post, and i now see that you indeed meant something different!. i’ll leave the below as an archive.)
[there are exponentially more younger (where younger means later) universes, therefore...] if we are trying to maximize the amount of good across all universes, what we should evidentially care about is what is happening soonest in time across all universes
i could have misinterpreted this somehow, but it seems like a mistake mainly of this form:
(premise) statement A is true for set Y.
statement A being true for set Z would imply statement B is true for set Z.
therefore statement B is true for set Z.
(2) is invalid, because it has not been established that statement A is true of set Z, only that it’s true of set Y.
Applying this to the quote:
for Y:[the set of all possible universes], A:[most universes are younger (existing later in time)].
~A:[most moments[2] are younger (beginning later in time)] being true for Z:[moments within a single universe] implies B:[the majority of moments are the last[3] possible one] for Z
therefore B is true for Z
(my original natural language phrasing: though there are vastly more younger [later] universes, this does not imply younger [later] points in time within a single universe’s time are quantitatively more than those at earlier points.)
i think these are both orthogonal to your argument for ‘ultimate neartermism’.
for acausal trade considerations, just model the portions of different utility across worlds and make the trade accordingly.
though, new universes coming into existence ‘eternally’ (and at a non-diminishing rate) implies an infinite amount. possible values respond differently to this.
for some, which care about quantity, they will always be maxxed out along all dimensions due to infinite quantity* - at least, unless something they care about occurs with exactly 0% frequency—which could, i think, be influenced by portional acausal trade in certain logically-possible circumstances. (i.e maybe not possible for ‘actual reality’, but possible at least in some mathematical universes)
other utility functions might care about portion—that is, portion of / frequency within the infinite amount of worlds—rather than quantity. (e.g., i think my altruism still cares about this, though it’s really tragic that there’s infinite suffering). these ones acausal trade with each other.
* actually, that’s not necessarily true. it can be reasoned that the amount is never actually infinite, only exponentially large, no matter how long it continues (2^x never does reach infinity), in which case at any actual point in time, quantity can still be increased / decreased.
it seems to me that another understandable language mistake was made: a ‘younger universe’ (i.e a universe which begun to exist after already-existing (older) ones) sounds like it would, when translated to a single universe, mean ‘an earlier point in time within that universe’; after all, a universe where less time has passed is younger. but ‘younger’ actually meant ‘occurs later’, in that context, plus we’re now discussing moments rather than universes.
to paraphrase what i think you mean: “new universes are eternally coming into existence at an exponentially increasing rate, and where no universes can be causally influenced by actions in other ones”. in that case:
because they’re all causally separated, we can ignore which are newer or older and just model the portions between them.
(it’s true that most copies of us would exist in later universes)
given causal separateness: apart from acausal trade, the best action is the same as if there were only one world: to focus on the long term (of that single universe).
(considerations related to acausal trade and infinite universe amount in footnote)[1]
i don’t see where this implies ultimate-neartermism. below i’ll write where i think your reasoning went wrong, if i understood it correctly. (edit: i read hans’ post, and i now see that you indeed meant something different!. i’ll leave the below as an archive.)
i could have misinterpreted this somehow, but it seems like a mistake mainly of this form:
(premise) statement A is true for set Y.
statement A being true for set Z would imply statement B is true for set Z.
therefore statement B is true for set Z.
(2) is invalid, because it has not been established that statement A is true of set Z, only that it’s true of set Y.
Applying this to the quote:
for Y:[the set of all possible universes], A:[most universes are younger (existing later in time)].
~A:[most moments[2] are younger (beginning later in time)] being true for Z:[moments within a single universe] implies B:[the majority of moments are the last[3] possible one] for Z
therefore B is true for Z
(my original natural language phrasing: though there are vastly more younger [later] universes, this does not imply younger [later] points in time within a single universe’s time are quantitatively more than those at earlier points.)
i think these are both orthogonal to your argument for ‘ultimate neartermism’.
for acausal trade considerations, just model the portions of different utility across worlds and make the trade accordingly.
though, new universes coming into existence ‘eternally’ (and at a non-diminishing rate) implies an infinite amount. possible values respond differently to this.
for some, which care about quantity, they will always be maxxed out along all dimensions due to infinite quantity* - at least, unless something they care about occurs with exactly 0% frequency—which could, i think, be influenced by portional acausal trade in certain logically-possible circumstances. (i.e maybe not possible for ‘actual reality’, but possible at least in some mathematical universes)
other utility functions might care about portion—that is, portion of / frequency within the infinite amount of worlds—rather than quantity. (e.g., i think my altruism still cares about this, though it’s really tragic that there’s infinite suffering). these ones acausal trade with each other.
* actually, that’s not necessarily true. it can be reasoned that the amount is never actually infinite, only exponentially large, no matter how long it continues (2^x never does reach infinity), in which case at any actual point in time, quantity can still be increased / decreased.
(also, a slightly different statement A is used in (2): about moments rather than universes)
it seems to me that another understandable language mistake was made: a ‘younger universe’ (i.e a universe which begun to exist after already-existing (older) ones) sounds like it would, when translated to a single universe, mean ‘an earlier point in time within that universe’; after all, a universe where less time has passed is younger. but ‘younger’ actually meant ‘occurs later’, in that context, plus we’re now discussing moments rather than universes.