First of all, before the bulk of my response, there are globally catastrophic or existential risks which will seem less “out there” than others. I think most laypeople will respond better intellectually and emotionally to mitigating the chances of a pandemic, global food insecurity, or the tail-risks of climate change than A.I. catastrophe or geomagnetic storms. As foundations like the Open Philanthropy Project both find more and better opportunities for grants to mitigate GCRs, and also normalize granting to these causes in coming years, it may become (much) easier for the marginal effective altruist at a foundation to make grants in this direction. Anyway...
I agree it won’t be as feasible to move money to “out there” causes at some foundations, but I think an effective altruist should take what they can get. I mean, we shouldn’t literally be as blunt in our decision-making as that, but I’ll give you an example.
Let’s imagine a student at Oxford University named Mary has made a significant plan change because of 80,000 Hours, and she intend to go work at a foundation in an effort to influence where the funds go. Because of her strengths and connections, Mary has great fit and opportunity to make it in foundation work. She also studies Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, a major which poises her to do foundation work in the U.K. better than, say, a major in Psychology or Chemistry. However, because of her interaction with effective altruism, tMary has decided her personal priority is mitigating A.I. risk, even though almost any foundation which would hire her would at best let her make grants to AMF or GiveDirectly. Should Mary still aim to work at a foundation?
I think there’s still a case to be made. What seems a dilemma may be two opportunities in disguise. By working at a foundation making grants to AMF, Mary is having the greatest impact she could have for not just global poverty, but any cause, by doing direct work. If we assume she considered either earning to give or direct research on the value alignment problem, and still concluded the best fit for her was grantmaking in foundations, I don’t think this new development changes her comparative advantage. So, she can take a job at that foundation. Meanwhile, if she earns enough, she can still donate to MIRI on the side, as a form of indirect impact. This combination of choices ensures she’s still having the greatest impact she could expect to have at the beginning of her career. As she climbs the ladder, builds career capital, and gains a reputation, Mary puts herself in a position to make grants direclty to “out-there” causes at another foundation, if that ever becomes a future possibility.
Now, I don’t think this example can be used to justify what advice is given to effective altruists in general. However, when talking about career selection, the inside view can matter as much for an individual effective altruist making choices for themself as much as the outside view matters to advising the marginal EA in the abstract. As someone currently agnostic between causes due as much to my disposition to being indecisive as much as to my real uncertainty, an indecisiveness which challenges my career selection as well, I’d be ecstatic at an opportunity like the one I’ve devised for Mary. To have confidence that I don’t need to make an ultimate cause selection between two overwhelming options before I start having a leveraged impact would make an EA career psychologically easier for me. I doubt I’m the only effective altruist who feels this way.
First of all, before the bulk of my response, there are globally catastrophic or existential risks which will seem less “out there” than others. I think most laypeople will respond better intellectually and emotionally to mitigating the chances of a pandemic, global food insecurity, or the tail-risks of climate change than A.I. catastrophe or geomagnetic storms. As foundations like the Open Philanthropy Project both find more and better opportunities for grants to mitigate GCRs, and also normalize granting to these causes in coming years, it may become (much) easier for the marginal effective altruist at a foundation to make grants in this direction. Anyway...
I agree it won’t be as feasible to move money to “out there” causes at some foundations, but I think an effective altruist should take what they can get. I mean, we shouldn’t literally be as blunt in our decision-making as that, but I’ll give you an example.
Let’s imagine a student at Oxford University named Mary has made a significant plan change because of 80,000 Hours, and she intend to go work at a foundation in an effort to influence where the funds go. Because of her strengths and connections, Mary has great fit and opportunity to make it in foundation work. She also studies Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, a major which poises her to do foundation work in the U.K. better than, say, a major in Psychology or Chemistry. However, because of her interaction with effective altruism, tMary has decided her personal priority is mitigating A.I. risk, even though almost any foundation which would hire her would at best let her make grants to AMF or GiveDirectly. Should Mary still aim to work at a foundation?
I think there’s still a case to be made. What seems a dilemma may be two opportunities in disguise. By working at a foundation making grants to AMF, Mary is having the greatest impact she could have for not just global poverty, but any cause, by doing direct work. If we assume she considered either earning to give or direct research on the value alignment problem, and still concluded the best fit for her was grantmaking in foundations, I don’t think this new development changes her comparative advantage. So, she can take a job at that foundation. Meanwhile, if she earns enough, she can still donate to MIRI on the side, as a form of indirect impact. This combination of choices ensures she’s still having the greatest impact she could expect to have at the beginning of her career. As she climbs the ladder, builds career capital, and gains a reputation, Mary puts herself in a position to make grants direclty to “out-there” causes at another foundation, if that ever becomes a future possibility.
Now, I don’t think this example can be used to justify what advice is given to effective altruists in general. However, when talking about career selection, the inside view can matter as much for an individual effective altruist making choices for themself as much as the outside view matters to advising the marginal EA in the abstract. As someone currently agnostic between causes due as much to my disposition to being indecisive as much as to my real uncertainty, an indecisiveness which challenges my career selection as well, I’d be ecstatic at an opportunity like the one I’ve devised for Mary. To have confidence that I don’t need to make an ultimate cause selection between two overwhelming options before I start having a leveraged impact would make an EA career psychologically easier for me. I doubt I’m the only effective altruist who feels this way.