All the argument shows is that it is logically possible for AGI not to be aligned. Since Bryan Caplan is a sane human being, it’s improbable that he would ever not have accepted that claim. So, it’s unclear why Yudkowsky would have presented it to him as an important argument about AGI alignment.
“1′. AIs have a non-trivial chance of being dangerously un-nice.
I do find this plausible, though only because many governments will create un-nice AIs on purpose.”
Which to me sounds like he doesn’t really get it. Like he’s ignoring “by default does things we regard as harmful” (which he kind of agrees to above; he agrees with “2. Instrumental convergence”). You’re right in that the Orthogonality Thesis doesn’t carry the argument on it’s own, but in conjunction with Instrumental Convergence (and to be more complete, mesa-optimisation), I think it does.
It’s a shame that Caplan doesn’t reply to Yudkowsky’s follow up:
Bryan, would you say that you’re not worried about 1′ because:
1’a: You don’t think a paperclip maximizer is un-nice enough to be dangerous, even if it’s smarter than us. 1’b: You don’t think a paperclip maximizer of around human intelligence is un-nice enough to be dangerous, and you don’t foresee paperclip maximizers becoming much smarter than humans. 1’c: You don’t think that AGIs as un-nice as a paperclip maximizer are probable, unless those durned governments create AGIs that un-nice on purpose.
‘By default’ seems like another murky term. The orthogonality thesis asserts (something like) that it’s not something you should place a bet at arbitrarily long odds on, but maybe it’s nonetheless very likely to work out, because per Drexler, we just don’t code AI as an unbounded optimiser, which you might still call ‘by default’.
At the moment I have no idea what to think, tbh. But I lean towards focusing on GCRs that definitely need direct action in the short term, such as climate change, over ones that might be more destructive but where the relevant direct action is likely to be taken much further off.
So by ‘by default’ I mean without any concerted effort to address existential risk from AI, or just following “business as usual” with AI development. Yes, Drexler’s CAIS would be an example of this. But I’d argue that “just don’t code AI as an unbounded optimiser” is very likely to fail due to mesa-optimisers and convergent instrumental goals emerging in sufficiently powerful systems.
Interesting you mention climate change, as I actually went from focusing on that pre-EA to now thinking that AGI is a much more severe, and more immediate, threat! (Although I also remain interested in other more “mundane” GCRs.)
All the argument shows is that it is logically possible for AGI not to be aligned. Since Bryan Caplan is a sane human being, it’s improbable that he would ever not have accepted that claim. So, it’s unclear why Yudkowsky would have presented it to him as an important argument about AGI alignment.
So the last Caplan says there is:
Which to me sounds like he doesn’t really get it. Like he’s ignoring “by default does things we regard as harmful” (which he kind of agrees to above; he agrees with “2. Instrumental convergence”). You’re right in that the Orthogonality Thesis doesn’t carry the argument on it’s own, but in conjunction with Instrumental Convergence (and to be more complete, mesa-optimisation), I think it does.
It’s a shame that Caplan doesn’t reply to Yudkowsky’s follow up:
it’s tricky to see what happened in that debate because i have twitter and that blog blocked on weekdays!
I just posted a reply to a similar comment about orthogonality + IC here.
‘By default’ seems like another murky term. The orthogonality thesis asserts (something like) that it’s not something you should place a bet at arbitrarily long odds on, but maybe it’s nonetheless very likely to work out, because per Drexler, we just don’t code AI as an unbounded optimiser, which you might still call ‘by default’.
At the moment I have no idea what to think, tbh. But I lean towards focusing on GCRs that definitely need direct action in the short term, such as climate change, over ones that might be more destructive but where the relevant direct action is likely to be taken much further off.
So by ‘by default’ I mean without any concerted effort to address existential risk from AI, or just following “business as usual” with AI development. Yes, Drexler’s CAIS would be an example of this. But I’d argue that “just don’t code AI as an unbounded optimiser” is very likely to fail due to mesa-optimisers and convergent instrumental goals emerging in sufficiently powerful systems.
Interesting you mention climate change, as I actually went from focusing on that pre-EA to now thinking that AGI is a much more severe, and more immediate, threat! (Although I also remain interested in other more “mundane” GCRs.)