Great! I propose a concise 1-sentence summary that gets to the core of one of the main drawbacks of QF, and link to Mutual Matching, a ‘decentralized donor matching on steroids’, overcoming some of QF issues, that might have been interesting for the reader of this article.
QF really is an information eliciting mechanism, but much less a mechanism for solving the (obviously!) most notorious problem with public goods: the lack of funding due to free-riding and lacking incentives to contribute.
Yes, QF elicits the WTP, helping to inform about value & optimal size of the public good (PG). Is that what prevented us from solving the PG issues? Nope. It’s our lack of the central funder. As shown here, this funder would require deep pockets—sponsoring nearly 100% of the cost when n grows large (!), see the n2x vs.nx in the text. Lacking that funder, people again have insufficient incentive to contribute.
Mutual Matching, fully ‘decentralized donor matching on steroids’: With it, I address some core issues with QF. Donors mutually co-incentivize each other to donate more, by hard, direct incentives mutually created purely by their own conditional donations.
Arbitrarily high matching factor (->incentive) are theoretically achievable—well, in practice all depends on statistical distribution of contributors etc. It is the first attempt I’m aware of that most directly tries to scale up the simple idea of incentivizing with “if you give, I give” → to n people, each one with each one, without requirement to negotiate.
Great! I propose a concise 1-sentence summary that gets to the core of one of the main drawbacks of QF, and link to Mutual Matching, a ‘decentralized donor matching on steroids’, overcoming some of QF issues, that might have been interesting for the reader of this article.
QF really is an information eliciting mechanism, but much less a mechanism for solving the (obviously!) most notorious problem with public goods: the lack of funding due to free-riding and lacking incentives to contribute.
Yes, QF elicits the WTP, helping to inform about value & optimal size of the public good (PG). Is that what prevented us from solving the PG issues? Nope. It’s our lack of the central funder. As shown here, this funder would require deep pockets—sponsoring nearly 100% of the cost when n grows large (!), see the n2x vs.nx in the text. Lacking that funder, people again have insufficient incentive to contribute.
Mutual Matching, fully ‘decentralized donor matching on steroids’: With it, I address some core issues with QF. Donors mutually co-incentivize each other to donate more, by hard, direct incentives mutually created purely by their own conditional donations.
Arbitrarily high matching factor (->incentive) are theoretically achievable—well, in practice all depends on statistical distribution of contributors etc. It is the first attempt I’m aware of that most directly tries to scale up the simple idea of incentivizing with “if you give, I give” → to n people, each one with each one, without requirement to negotiate.