As I understand their position, MIRI tends to not like IIT because it’s insufficiently functionalist—and too physicalist. On the other hand, I don’t think IIT could be correct because it’s too functionalist—and insufficiently physicalist, partially for the reasons I explain in my response to Jessica.
The core approach I’ve taken is to enumerate the sorts of problems one would need to solve if one was to formalize consciousness. (Whether consciousness is a thing-that-can-be-formalized is another question, of course.) My analysis is that IIT satisfactorily addresses 4 or 5, out of the 8 problems. Moving to a more physical basis would address more of these problems, though not all (a big topic in PQ is how to interpret IIT-like output, which is an independent task of how to generate it).
Other research along these same lines would be e.g.,
As I understand their position, MIRI tends to not like IIT because it’s insufficiently functionalist—and too physicalist. On the other hand, I don’t think IIT could be correct because it’s too functionalist—and insufficiently physicalist, partially for the reasons I explain in my response to Jessica.
The core approach I’ve taken is to enumerate the sorts of problems one would need to solve if one was to formalize consciousness. (Whether consciousness is a thing-that-can-be-formalized is another question, of course.) My analysis is that IIT satisfactorily addresses 4 or 5, out of the 8 problems. Moving to a more physical basis would address more of these problems, though not all (a big topic in PQ is how to interpret IIT-like output, which is an independent task of how to generate it).
Other research along these same lines would be e.g.,
->Adam Barrett’s FIIH: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3912322/
->Max Tegmark’s Perceptronium: https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.1219