Executive summary: The author argues that across suitcase-style uncertainty cases and their variants, every plausible form of deontology yields either worse-for-everyone outcomes or inconsistent choice cycles, leaving no stable version.
Key points:
In suitcase cases, pushing reduces each person’s risk ex-ante, so ex-ante deontology implies pushing because it benefits everyone in expectation.
Ex-ante deontology breaks down in sequential decisions, where it recommends starting actions that it later requires stopping, producing outcomes that are worse for someone and better for no one.
Attempts to fix this with sophisticated or resolute choice lead to further implausible results, including endorsing earlier harmful actions or making permissibility depend on distant past commitments.
Ex-post deontology (never push) rejects actions that improve everyone’s prospects and leads to cases where sequences of permissible acts replicate impermissible harm or generate deontic cycling.
Even minimally Paretian deontology fails in shuffle-style cases that produce cycles where every option is ruled out as either violating constraints or being Pareto-dominated.
Additional problems—such as vague thresholds for “knowing a person,” incentives to remain ignorant, and inconsistent verdicts under partial information or identical agents—further undermine deontological views.
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Executive summary: The author argues that across suitcase-style uncertainty cases and their variants, every plausible form of deontology yields either worse-for-everyone outcomes or inconsistent choice cycles, leaving no stable version.
Key points:
In suitcase cases, pushing reduces each person’s risk ex-ante, so ex-ante deontology implies pushing because it benefits everyone in expectation.
Ex-ante deontology breaks down in sequential decisions, where it recommends starting actions that it later requires stopping, producing outcomes that are worse for someone and better for no one.
Attempts to fix this with sophisticated or resolute choice lead to further implausible results, including endorsing earlier harmful actions or making permissibility depend on distant past commitments.
Ex-post deontology (never push) rejects actions that improve everyone’s prospects and leads to cases where sequences of permissible acts replicate impermissible harm or generate deontic cycling.
Even minimally Paretian deontology fails in shuffle-style cases that produce cycles where every option is ruled out as either violating constraints or being Pareto-dominated.
Additional problems—such as vague thresholds for “knowing a person,” incentives to remain ignorant, and inconsistent verdicts under partial information or identical agents—further undermine deontological views.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.