The discussion here might be related, and specifically this paper that was shared. However, you can use a credible interval without any theoretical commitments, only practical ones. From this post:
Give an expected error/CI relative to some better estimator—either a counterpart of yours (“I think there’s a 12% chance of a famine in South Sudan this year, but if I spent another 5 hours on this I’d expect to move by 6%”); or a hypothetical one (“12%, but my 95% CI for what a superforecaster median would be is [0%-45%]”). This works better when one does not expect to get access to the ‘true value’ (“What was the ‘right’ ex ante probability Trump wins the 2016 election?”)
This way, you can say that your probabilities are actually sharp at any moment, but more or less prone to change given new information.
That being said, I think people are doing something unjustified by having precise probabilities (“Why not 1% higher or lower?”), and I endorse something that looks like the maximality rule in Maximal Cluelessness for decision theory, although I think we need to aim for more structure somehow, since as discussed in the paper, it makes cluelessness really bad. I discuss this a little in this post (in the summary), and in this thread. This is related to ambiguity aversion and deep uncertainty.
The discussion here might be related, and specifically this paper that was shared. However, you can use a credible interval without any theoretical commitments, only practical ones. From this post:
This way, you can say that your probabilities are actually sharp at any moment, but more or less prone to change given new information.
That being said, I think people are doing something unjustified by having precise probabilities (“Why not 1% higher or lower?”), and I endorse something that looks like the maximality rule in Maximal Cluelessness for decision theory, although I think we need to aim for more structure somehow, since as discussed in the paper, it makes cluelessness really bad. I discuss this a little in this post (in the summary), and in this thread. This is related to ambiguity aversion and deep uncertainty.