Thanks, I thought this was very good. I liked the methodology—the categorisation, the use of Guesstimate, and the extensive input from experts. It’s also very clearly written. I look forward to reading the rest of the series.
One thing that might be worth thinking about is how the list of Great Powers interacts with the sources of existential risk. E.g. if one thinks that most risk stems from future technologies, then current nuclear arsenals may not be as relevant as them may seem (cf. the comments on Russia). That would in turn entail that efforts to reduce existential risk from Great Power war should be directed towards countries that are most likely to develop such future technologies.
Relatedly, it seems conceivable to me that those countries could include some smaller ones—that aren’t naturally seen as “Great Powers”—such as the UK, France, and Israel. And it may be that use of those technologies will be so devastating that small countries that have them could defeat countries with a much larger GDP. So potentially the analysis shouldn’t be focused on Great Power conflict per se but more generally on conflict and war between actors with powerful weapons.
Or even moreso, that we should be aiming to build a broad framework that addresses weapons and military technology as a broad class of things needing regulation of which nuclear weapons are seen as just the beginning.
Thanks, I thought this was very good. I liked the methodology—the categorisation, the use of Guesstimate, and the extensive input from experts. It’s also very clearly written. I look forward to reading the rest of the series.
One thing that might be worth thinking about is how the list of Great Powers interacts with the sources of existential risk. E.g. if one thinks that most risk stems from future technologies, then current nuclear arsenals may not be as relevant as them may seem (cf. the comments on Russia). That would in turn entail that efforts to reduce existential risk from Great Power war should be directed towards countries that are most likely to develop such future technologies.
Relatedly, it seems conceivable to me that those countries could include some smaller ones—that aren’t naturally seen as “Great Powers”—such as the UK, France, and Israel. And it may be that use of those technologies will be so devastating that small countries that have them could defeat countries with a much larger GDP. So potentially the analysis shouldn’t be focused on Great Power conflict per se but more generally on conflict and war between actors with powerful weapons.
Or even moreso, that we should be aiming to build a broad framework that addresses weapons and military technology as a broad class of things needing regulation of which nuclear weapons are seen as just the beginning.