One-off events and policy lock-ins. The 2023 battery-cage ban failure. The empty regulatory space around broiler stocking density. The black soldier fly larvae industry, currently regulated by no one, and that wonāt last. These are problems where what matters is the size of the win, probabilities of success, how long it locks in, and whether it would have happened without you, not the marginal cost-effectiveness of one more dollar in the field.
How does the marginal cost-effectiveness (for example, the cost-effectiveness of a grant of a few k$) not matter? It is determined by factors like those you listed.
Cost-effectiveness scored lowest at 5.49.
How did you score the cost-effectiveness? Have you considered doing cost-effectiveness analyses (CEAs)? I would be happy to review some for free.
On marginal cost-effectiveness, youāre right that the factors I listed are exactly what determines marginal CE.
So the framing in that paragraph is imprecise.
What I was trying to point at was that the typical āone more dollar at the marginā thinking works well for funding ongoing work where each extra dollar buys more of the same thing.
But it doesnāt work as well in two situations.
The first is contexts where the ongoing work itself hasnāt been built out yet, so there isnāt a stable field at the margin to fund. The second is one-off events like passing a regulation, where extra funding may not change the probability of winning at all, or might only at a specific moment, but still maybe worth taking the bet given high CE.
And these are exactly the judgments the EA ecosystem is less equipped to make at armās length, which is part of why fewer such grants get made overall.
I should have written the paragraph that way.
On scoring did the rough back-of-the-envelope calculations which informed the subjective scoring of 1-10 in an area. For some data/āevidence poor interventions we just did subjective scoring.
On your offer to review CEAs, weād love help on that for the next round and Iāll DM you to follow up.
The first is contexts where the ongoing work itself hasnāt been built out yet, so there isnāt a stable field at the margin to fund.
I would say thinking at the margin still makes sense for initial work. It is just that the thinking cannot be based on an established track record.
The second is one-off events like passing a regulation, where extra funding may not change the probability of winning at all, or might only at a specific moment, but still maybe worth taking the bet given high CE.
Extra funding which does not change the probability of winning at all has a cost-effectiveness of 0 neglecting effects besides those of passing the regulation?
On your offer to review CEAs, weād love help on that for the next round and Iāll DM you to follow up.
Both fair, and I think weāre mostly agreeing on substance.
Regarding your second point, the āhigh CEā in my original sentence referred to the CE of solving the policy issue itself, not the marginal CE of the next dollar. So, funding may still shift the probability of winning, just deferred to when a window opens rather than at the moment of funding, because it may fund prep work and exploratory research on a high-suffering issue.
Thanks for this, Chetan and Anita.
How does the marginal cost-effectiveness (for example, the cost-effectiveness of a grant of a few k$) not matter? It is determined by factors like those you listed.
How did you score the cost-effectiveness? Have you considered doing cost-effectiveness analyses (CEAs)? I would be happy to review some for free.
Thanks Vasco, this is a fair critique.
On marginal cost-effectiveness, youāre right that the factors I listed are exactly what determines marginal CE.
So the framing in that paragraph is imprecise.
What I was trying to point at was that the typical āone more dollar at the marginā thinking works well for funding ongoing work where each extra dollar buys more of the same thing.
But it doesnāt work as well in two situations.
The first is contexts where the ongoing work itself hasnāt been built out yet, so there isnāt a stable field at the margin to fund. The second is one-off events like passing a regulation, where extra funding may not change the probability of winning at all, or might only at a specific moment, but still maybe worth taking the bet given high CE.
And these are exactly the judgments the EA ecosystem is less equipped to make at armās length, which is part of why fewer such grants get made overall.
I should have written the paragraph that way.
On scoring did the rough back-of-the-envelope calculations which informed the subjective scoring of 1-10 in an area. For some data/āevidence poor interventions we just did subjective scoring.
On your offer to review CEAs, weād love help on that for the next round and Iāll DM you to follow up.
I would say thinking at the margin still makes sense for initial work. It is just that the thinking cannot be based on an established track record.
Extra funding which does not change the probability of winning at all has a cost-effectiveness of 0 neglecting effects besides those of passing the regulation?
Nice.
Both fair, and I think weāre mostly agreeing on substance.
Regarding your second point, the āhigh CEā in my original sentence referred to the CE of solving the policy issue itself, not the marginal CE of the next dollar. So, funding may still shift the probability of winning, just deferred to when a window opens rather than at the moment of funding, because it may fund prep work and exploratory research on a high-suffering issue.