Being specific about empirical beliefs that push for more patience
When patient philanthropy is counterfactual
Opportunities for donation trading between patient and non-patient donors
Whether I think we should be spending less now
In principle I think the effective giving community could be in a situation where we should marginally be saving/investing more than we currently do (being ‘patient’).
However, I don’t think we’re in such a situation and in fact believe the opposite. My main crux is AI timelines; if I thought that AGI was less likely than not to arrive this century, then I would almost certainly believe that the community should marginally be spending less now.
Useful definitions of patient philanthropy
I think patient philanthropy could be thought of as saying one of:
The community is spending at the optimal rate - let’s create a place to save/invest so ensure we don’t (mistakenly) overspend and keep our funds secure.
The community is spending above the optimal rate—let’s push for more savings on the margin, and create a place to save/invest and give later
I don’t think we should call (1) patient philanthropy. Large funders (e.g. Open Philanthropy) already do some form of (1) by just not spending all their capital all this year. Doing (1) is instrumentally useful for the community and is necessary in any case where the community is not spending all of its capital this year.
I like (2) a lot more. This definition is relative to the community’s current spending rate and could be intuitively ‘impatient’. Throughout, I’ll use ‘patient’ to refer to (2): thinking the community’s current spending rate is too high (and so we do better by saving more now and spending later).
As an aside, thinking that the most ‘influential’ time ahead is not equivalent to being patient. Non-patient funders can also think this but believe their last spending this year goes further than in any other year.
A potential third definition could be something like “patience is spending 0 to ~2% per year” but I don’t think it is useful to discuss.
Differences in beliefs between funders driving patience
Of course, the large funders and the patient philanthropist may have different beliefs that lead them to disagree on the community’s optimal spending rate. If I believes one of the following, I’d like decrease my guess of the community’s optimal spending rate (and becoming more patient):
Thinking that there are not good opportunities to spend lots on now (i.e. higher diminishing returns to spending)
Thinking that TAI / AGI is further away.
Thinking that the rate of non-AI global catastrophic risk (e.g. nuclear war, biorisk) is lower
Thinking that there’ll be great spending opportunities in the run-up to AGI
Thinking that capital will be useful post-AGI
Thinking that the existing large funders’s capital is less secure or the large funders’ future effective giving less likely for other reasons
Since it seems likely that there are multiple points of disagreement leading to different spending rates, ‘‘patient philanthropy’ may be a useful term for the cluster of empirical beliefs that imply the community should be spending less. However, it seems better to be more specific about which particular beliefs are driving this the most.
For example “AI skeptical patient philanthropists” and “better-AI-opportunities-now patient philanthropists” may agree that the community’s current spending rate is too high, but disagree on the optimal (rate of) future spending.
When patient philanthropy is counterfactual
Patient philanthropists can be considered as funders with a very high ‘bar’. That is, they will only spend down on opportunities better than x utils per $ and if none currently exist, they will wait.
Non-patient philanthropists also operate similarly but with a lower bar y<x. While the non-patient philanthropist has funds (and funds anything above x utils per dollar, including the opportunities that the patient philanthropist would otherwise fund) the patient philanthropist spends nothing. The patient philanthropist reasons that the counterfactual value of funding something the non-patient philanthropist would fund is zero and so chooses to save.
In this setup, the patient philanthropist is looking to fund and take credit for the ‘best’ opportunities and—while the large funder is around—the patient philanthropist is just funging with them. Once the large funder runs out of funds, the patient philanthropist’s funding is counterfactual.[1]
If the large funder and patient philanthropist have differences in values or empirical beliefs, it is unsurprising they have different guesses of the optimal spending rate and ‘bar’.
However, this should not happen with value and belief-aligned funders and patient philanthropists; if the funder is acting ‘rationally’ and spending at the optimal rate, then (by definition) there are no type-2 patient patient philanthropists that have the same beliefs.
Opportunities for donation trading between patient and non-patient small donors
There are some opportunities for trade between patient philanthropists and non-patient philanthropists, similar to how people can bet on AI timelines.
Let’s say Alice pledges to give $a/year from her income and thinks that the community should be spending more now. Let’s say that Bob thinks the community should be spending less and and saves $b/year from his income in order to give it away later. There’s likely an agreement possible (dependent on many factors) where they both benefit. A simple setup could involve:
Bob, for the next c years gives away their $b/year to Alice’s choice of giving opportunity
Alice, after c years, giving $a/year to Bob’s preferred method of investing/saving or giving
This example closely follows similar setups suggested for betting on AI timelines.
Unless the amazing opportunity ofz utils/$ appears just after the large funder runs out of funds. Where ‘just after’ is the time that the large funder would have kept going with their existing spending strategy of funding everything about x utils/$ by using the patient philanthropist’s funds.
Some takes on patient philanthropy
Epistemic status: I’ve done work suggesting that AI risk funders be spending at a higher rate, and I’m confident in this result. The other takes are less informed!
I discuss
Whether I think we should be spending less now
Useful definitions of patient philanthropy
Being specific about empirical beliefs that push for more patience
When patient philanthropy is counterfactual
Opportunities for donation trading between patient and non-patient donors
Whether I think we should be spending less now
In principle I think the effective giving community could be in a situation where we should marginally be saving/investing more than we currently do (being ‘patient’).
However, I don’t think we’re in such a situation and in fact believe the opposite. My main crux is AI timelines; if I thought that AGI was less likely than not to arrive this century, then I would almost certainly believe that the community should marginally be spending less now.
Useful definitions of patient philanthropy
I think patient philanthropy could be thought of as saying one of:
The community is spending at the optimal rate - let’s create a place to save/invest so ensure we don’t (mistakenly) overspend and keep our funds secure.
The community is spending above the optimal rate—let’s push for more savings on the margin, and create a place to save/invest and give later
I don’t think we should call (1) patient philanthropy. Large funders (e.g. Open Philanthropy) already do some form of (1) by just not spending all their capital all this year. Doing (1) is instrumentally useful for the community and is necessary in any case where the community is not spending all of its capital this year.
I like (2) a lot more. This definition is relative to the community’s current spending rate and could be intuitively ‘impatient’. Throughout, I’ll use ‘patient’ to refer to (2): thinking the community’s current spending rate is too high (and so we do better by saving more now and spending later).
As an aside, thinking that the most ‘influential’ time ahead is not equivalent to being patient. Non-patient funders can also think this but believe their last spending this year goes further than in any other year.
A potential third definition could be something like “patience is spending 0 to ~2% per year” but I don’t think it is useful to discuss.
Differences in beliefs between funders driving patience
Of course, the large funders and the patient philanthropist may have different beliefs that lead them to disagree on the community’s optimal spending rate. If I believes one of the following, I’d like decrease my guess of the community’s optimal spending rate (and becoming more patient):
Thinking that there are not good opportunities to spend lots on now (i.e. higher diminishing returns to spending)
Thinking that TAI / AGI is further away.
Thinking that the rate of non-AI global catastrophic risk (e.g. nuclear war, biorisk) is lower
Thinking that there’ll be great spending opportunities in the run-up to AGI
Thinking that capital will be useful post-AGI
Thinking that the existing large funders’s capital is less secure or the large funders’ future effective giving less likely for other reasons
Since it seems likely that there are multiple points of disagreement leading to different spending rates, ‘‘patient philanthropy’ may be a useful term for the cluster of empirical beliefs that imply the community should be spending less. However, it seems better to be more specific about which particular beliefs are driving this the most.
For example “AI skeptical patient philanthropists” and “better-AI-opportunities-now patient philanthropists” may agree that the community’s current spending rate is too high, but disagree on the optimal (rate of) future spending.
When patient philanthropy is counterfactual
Patient philanthropists can be considered as funders with a very high ‘bar’. That is, they will only spend down on opportunities better than x utils per $ and if none currently exist, they will wait.
Non-patient philanthropists also operate similarly but with a lower bar y<x. While the non-patient philanthropist has funds (and funds anything above x utils per dollar, including the opportunities that the patient philanthropist would otherwise fund) the patient philanthropist spends nothing. The patient philanthropist reasons that the counterfactual value of funding something the non-patient philanthropist would fund is zero and so chooses to save.
In this setup, the patient philanthropist is looking to fund and take credit for the ‘best’ opportunities and—while the large funder is around—the patient philanthropist is just funging with them. Once the large funder runs out of funds, the patient philanthropist’s funding is counterfactual.[1]
If the large funder and patient philanthropist have differences in values or empirical beliefs, it is unsurprising they have different guesses of the optimal spending rate and ‘bar’.
However, this should not happen with value and belief-aligned funders and patient philanthropists; if the funder is acting ‘rationally’ and spending at the optimal rate, then (by definition) there are no type-2 patient patient philanthropists that have the same beliefs.
Opportunities for donation trading between patient and non-patient small donors
There are some opportunities for trade between patient philanthropists and non-patient philanthropists, similar to how people can bet on AI timelines.
Let’s say Alice pledges to give $a/year from her income and thinks that the community should be spending more now. Let’s say that Bob thinks the community should be spending less and and saves $b/year from his income in order to give it away later. There’s likely an agreement possible (dependent on many factors) where they both benefit. A simple setup could involve:
Bob, for the next c years gives away their $b/year to Alice’s choice of giving opportunity
Alice, after c years, giving $a/year to Bob’s preferred method of investing/saving or giving
This example closely follows similar setups suggested for betting on AI timelines.
Unless the amazing opportunity ofz utils/$ appears just after the large funder runs out of funds. Where ‘just after’ is the time that the large funder would have kept going with their existing spending strategy of funding everything about x utils/$ by using the patient philanthropist’s funds.