I’d argue that the universe in which FTX exposure was at its lowest is the world in which all grantees were small . . . but were properly incorporated and managed like corporations (no comingling of money, observance of corporate formalities, etc.)
It would be easier to manage a scenario with few big entities, but it’d be a lot easier for John Ray & Co. to manage too—especially because those orgs would be more likely to have non-FTX-derived assets that could be taken to satisfy a judgment.
With proper corporate status, the individuals should have been safe, as a corp-to-its-individual employee transfer seems to be beyond the reach of section 550′s power over subsequent transferees. And the individual grantee corporations would make relatively unattractive targets for several reasons (mainly having little money to net per lawsuit).
In other words, I think the core defect was not structuring grantees appropriately rather than their size per se.
I’d argue that the universe in which FTX exposure was at its lowest is the world in which all grantees were small . . . but were properly incorporated and managed like corporations (no comingling of money, observance of corporate formalities, etc.)
It would be easier to manage a scenario with few big entities, but it’d be a lot easier for John Ray & Co. to manage too—especially because those orgs would be more likely to have non-FTX-derived assets that could be taken to satisfy a judgment.
With proper corporate status, the individuals should have been safe, as a corp-to-its-individual employee transfer seems to be beyond the reach of section 550′s power over subsequent transferees. And the individual grantee corporations would make relatively unattractive targets for several reasons (mainly having little money to net per lawsuit).
In other words, I think the core defect was not structuring grantees appropriately rather than their size per se.