So… your point is that it could lead to justices (i) curtailing AI development & (ii) risking the whole semiconductor industry world wide by locking it in Taiwan? That’s a long slippery slope (but you could say it’s not so much longer than climate change leading to famine...)
First, I’m not sure if I want that Taiwan becomes “replaceable” as a leading manufacturer, as it’d make it more likely to be invaded (though decreasing the odds of nuclear powers confrontation). but that’s beyond the point.
Second… yeah, I think there’s a risk of abuse in inflating legal concepts. But I am not sure courts are that powerful, nor so daring. I could imagine a judge ruling against things they can understand may lead to harm, such as gain of function or “murderbots” research, especially if there’s an example where it has caused harm, but not against tech development in general.
But ultimately, yes, I think the risk of court abuse is one of the problems in extending legal doctrines to catastrophic risk mitigation.
The endless creation of new rights—and corresponding duties for public bodies to attend to such rights – is a giant gun pointed at the head of the West. Most notably, the various rights we have created around environmental review and consultation are strangling our ability to build any infrastructure. This alone is largely responsible for the soaring constructions costs of everything from American highways to British railway lines (the disease seems to be worse in common law countries). Vide Brookings: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/WP54_Brooks-Liscow_updated.pdf
Create a new right for people not to die by AGI or whatever and it will be relentlessly abused in all sorts of entertaining ways for people to block development.
(the disease seems to be worse in common law countries). Vide Brookings:
Actually, the report you linked blames it mostly on increases in income and housing prices.
We do find empirical evidence consistent with two hypotheses. The first is that the demand for more expensive Interstate highways increases with income, as either richer people are willing to pay for more expensive highways or in any case they can have their interests heard in the political process. The doubling in real median per capita income over the period accounts for roughly half of the increase in expenditures per mile over the period. Also consistent with this, and with the finding that the increased costs are due to increased inputs, not per unit input prices, we show that states construct more ancillary structures, such as bridges and ramps, and more wiggly routes in later years of the program. Controls for home value also account for a large proportion of the temporal increase; taken together, income and home value increases account for almost all the temporal change in costs.
And about “citizen voice”:
The second hypothesis with which our data are consistent is the rise of “citizen voice” in the late 1960s and early 1970s. [...] Some of these tools, such as environmental review, were directly aimed at increasing the cost of government behavior, by requiring the government to fully internalize the negative externalities of Interstate construction. Other new tools, such as mandated public input, could yield construction of additional highway accoutrement (such as noise barriers), create delays, or increase planning costs.
I think that’s a problem that countries without rule of law don’t have… but then they have other obstacles for development.
But most of all, I’m sorry, but I’m sort of confused about what exactly is your point here—if, e.g., it’s about legal interferences in general, or only about rights-based litigation, or about how those interferences make us lag behind those who don’t have it. More precisely, I’m in doubt between something like: i. “we shouldn’t create legal interferences with tech development, they are inefficient and slow down economic development—and there will be less welfare in the long-run”;
ii. “we shouldn’t create legal interferences with tech development, otherwise we’ll be surpassed by countries and organizations who don’t mind about them”;
iii. “we shouldn’t create rights-based legal interference with tech development, as it increases litigaton and is more inefficient than top-down regulation, or than self-regulation”. I disagre with (i), because I think that the costs of slowing down c-risks are worth it. Perhaps you disagree with me, but then I see no point in discussing it here (I mean, my question assumes that are willing to incur some costs to mitigate c-risks). I sort of disagree with (ii), because I think that “hawkish arms-race” reasoning is precisely one of the main factors driving c-risks up; on the other hand, I have to reckon the risk of playing dove and of “regulatory arbitrage”: regulation is ineffective if companies can just move to somewhere where it doesn’t apply (or if they lose marketshare to companies in those places), and the risks remain. But there might be ways to mitigate this problem—e.g., EU taxing imports to prevent carbon leakage.
I feel tempted to agree with (iii); but then, I’m not sure if that’s an option at all, at least for now. Quite the opposite: top-down regulation will often come after precedents recognizing some rights, and self-regulation usually aims to respond to litigation and reputational risks.
So… your point is that it could lead to justices (i) curtailing AI development & (ii) risking the whole semiconductor industry world wide by locking it in Taiwan? That’s a long slippery slope (but you could say it’s not so much longer than climate change leading to famine...) First, I’m not sure if I want that Taiwan becomes “replaceable” as a leading manufacturer, as it’d make it more likely to be invaded (though decreasing the odds of nuclear powers confrontation). but that’s beyond the point. Second… yeah, I think there’s a risk of abuse in inflating legal concepts. But I am not sure courts are that powerful, nor so daring. I could imagine a judge ruling against things they can understand may lead to harm, such as gain of function or “murderbots” research, especially if there’s an example where it has caused harm, but not against tech development in general. But ultimately, yes, I think the risk of court abuse is one of the problems in extending legal doctrines to catastrophic risk mitigation.
The endless creation of new rights—and corresponding duties for public bodies to attend to such rights – is a giant gun pointed at the head of the West. Most notably, the various rights we have created around environmental review and consultation are strangling our ability to build any infrastructure. This alone is largely responsible for the soaring constructions costs of everything from American highways to British railway lines (the disease seems to be worse in common law countries). Vide Brookings: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/WP54_Brooks-Liscow_updated.pdf
Create a new right for people not to die by AGI or whatever and it will be relentlessly abused in all sorts of entertaining ways for people to block development.
Actually, the report you linked blames it mostly on increases in income and housing prices.
And about “citizen voice”:
I think that’s a problem that countries without rule of law don’t have… but then they have other obstacles for development.
But most of all, I’m sorry, but I’m sort of confused about what exactly is your point here—if, e.g., it’s about legal interferences in general, or only about rights-based litigation, or about how those interferences make us lag behind those who don’t have it. More precisely, I’m in doubt between something like:
i. “we shouldn’t create legal interferences with tech development, they are inefficient and slow down economic development—and there will be less welfare in the long-run”;
ii. “we shouldn’t create legal interferences with tech development, otherwise we’ll be surpassed by countries and organizations who don’t mind about them”;
iii. “we shouldn’t create rights-based legal interference with tech development, as it increases litigaton and is more inefficient than top-down regulation, or than self-regulation”.
I disagre with (i), because I think that the costs of slowing down c-risks are worth it. Perhaps you disagree with me, but then I see no point in discussing it here (I mean, my question assumes that are willing to incur some costs to mitigate c-risks).
I sort of disagree with (ii), because I think that “hawkish arms-race” reasoning is precisely one of the main factors driving c-risks up; on the other hand, I have to reckon the risk of playing dove and of “regulatory arbitrage”: regulation is ineffective if companies can just move to somewhere where it doesn’t apply (or if they lose marketshare to companies in those places), and the risks remain. But there might be ways to mitigate this problem—e.g., EU taxing imports to prevent carbon leakage.
I feel tempted to agree with (iii); but then, I’m not sure if that’s an option at all, at least for now. Quite the opposite: top-down regulation will often come after precedents recognizing some rights, and self-regulation usually aims to respond to litigation and reputational risks.