FWIW, my view is that there are states worse than being dead, such as extreme suffering.
I don’t mean that we should place less intrinsic worth on people’s lives because of their views, but I think it is okay to make decisions which do effectively violate the principle of valuing people equally—your women and children on lifeboats first is a good example of this. (Also agree with you that there’s a slippery slope here and important to distinguish between the two)
I think “don’t donate to solving problems where there is strong private sector incentive to solve them” is a good heuristic for using charity money as effectively as possible, because there is a very large private sector trying to maximise profit and a very small EA movement trying to maximise impact. Agree that EA doesn’t follow this heuristic very consistently, eg—I think we should donate less to alternative protein development since there’s strong private sector incentive there.
FWIW, my view is that there are states worse than being dead, such as extreme suffering.
I don’t mean that we should place less intrinsic worth on people’s lives because of their views, but I think it is okay to make decisions which do effectively violate the principle of valuing people equally—your women and children on lifeboats first is a good example of this. (Also agree with you that there’s a slippery slope here and important to distinguish between the two)
I think “don’t donate to solving problems where there is strong private sector incentive to solve them” is a good heuristic for using charity money as effectively as possible, because there is a very large private sector trying to maximise profit and a very small EA movement trying to maximise impact. Agree that EA doesn’t follow this heuristic very consistently, eg—I think we should donate less to alternative protein development since there’s strong private sector incentive there.