I guess my concern is if I said, “This depends on your stance on what counts as an epistemic fact, but you should accept the conclusions of a sound argument,” what prevents someone from saying, “Well, if it’s stance-dependent, then I’m totally justified in accepting unsound arguments.”? It seems a person would be equally as justified in accepting unsound arguments as they do sound ones.
Nothing prevents someone from saying that. But nothing would prevent someone from saying that even if epistemic realism were true.
Let’s say for a moment epistemic realism was false. What would you do? I’d do exactly what I currently do. It’s already important to care about what’s true, and there will be consequences for you if you ignore what’s true. The same is true for everyone else. Nothing would change. I don’t think the truth of epistemic realism would have practical consequences at all.
I guess my concern is if I said, “This depends on your stance on what counts as an epistemic fact, but you should accept the conclusions of a sound argument,” what prevents someone from saying, “Well, if it’s stance-dependent, then I’m totally justified in accepting unsound arguments.”? It seems a person would be equally as justified in accepting unsound arguments as they do sound ones.
Nothing prevents someone from saying that. But nothing would prevent someone from saying that even if epistemic realism were true.
Let’s say for a moment epistemic realism was false. What would you do? I’d do exactly what I currently do. It’s already important to care about what’s true, and there will be consequences for you if you ignore what’s true. The same is true for everyone else. Nothing would change. I don’t think the truth of epistemic realism would have practical consequences at all.
Interesting. I’ll have to think on this. Thanks for your comments!