By “suffering,” you can refer to states that agents consider undesirable, or you can refer to a state that an agent does not necessarily consider undesirable. If the former, at what point would you need to posit that the state involves some kind of “intrinsically undesirability”? You wouldn’t. The class of states would just consist of those states you desire not to have. If, instead, it’s not a state that you necessarily find undesirable, then it’s possible for you to not find it undesirable, or even to desire it.
At now point in any discussion of suffering does it ever make sense, nor do we ever benefit, from proposing that things can good or bad, desirable or undesirable, and so on, independent of our own attitudes or preferences with respect to those things. Philosophers will talk of things being “intrinsically bad” or and so on. I think this is all total nonsense.
By “suffering,” you can refer to states that agents consider undesirable, or you can refer to a state that an agent does not necessarily consider undesirable. If the former, at what point would you need to posit that the state involves some kind of “intrinsically undesirability”? You wouldn’t. The class of states would just consist of those states you desire not to have. If, instead, it’s not a state that you necessarily find undesirable, then it’s possible for you to not find it undesirable, or even to desire it.
At now point in any discussion of suffering does it ever make sense, nor do we ever benefit, from proposing that things can good or bad, desirable or undesirable, and so on, independent of our own attitudes or preferences with respect to those things. Philosophers will talk of things being “intrinsically bad” or and so on. I think this is all total nonsense.