Thanks for the response. What you describe doesn’t sound very objectionable to me, but I don’t think it’s what Bentham is arguing for. As far as I know, Bentham endorses non-naturalist moral realism, so he would not think that moral facts would be facts about natural phenomena such as our internal psychological states.
Ah, good catch! Yeah, my flavour of moral realism is definitely naturalist, so that’s a clear distinction between myself and Bentham, assuming you are correct about what he thinks.
Thanks for the response. What you describe doesn’t sound very objectionable to me, but I don’t think it’s what Bentham is arguing for. As far as I know, Bentham endorses non-naturalist moral realism, so he would not think that moral facts would be facts about natural phenomena such as our internal psychological states.
Ah, good catch! Yeah, my flavour of moral realism is definitely naturalist, so that’s a clear distinction between myself and Bentham, assuming you are correct about what he thinks.