Executive summary: This exploratory argument defends moral realism—the view that some moral truths are objective and stance-independent—by asserting that denying such truths leads to implausible and counterintuitive implications, and that our intuitive moral judgments are as epistemically justified as basic logical or perceptual beliefs.
Key points:
Definition and Defense of Moral Realism: The author defines moral realism as the belief in stance-independent moral truths and argues that some moral facts (e.g., the wrongness of torture) are too intuitively compelling to be explained away as subjective or false.
Critique of Anti-Realism’s Consequences: Moral anti-realism, the author argues, implies that even clearly irrational behaviors (e.g., self-harm, extreme sacrifice for trivial desires) are not mistaken as long as they are desired—an implication that runs counter to ordinary moral and rational intuitions.
Epistemology of Moral Beliefs: The author analogizes moral intuition to visual and logical perception, claiming that moral beliefs are justified in the same way as foundational beliefs in other domains—by intellectual appearances that seem self-evident unless strongly refuted.
Rebuttal of Common Objections: The post addresses key arguments against moral realism—such as disagreement, the supposed “queerness” of moral facts, and evolutionary debunking—and contends that these objections either misunderstand objectivity or rely on assumptions inconsistent with other accepted non-physical truths (e.g., logical or epistemic norms).
Moral Knowledge and Evolution: The author argues that our ability to access moral truths is best explained by evolution endowing us with rational faculties that can discover such truths, paralleling our capacity to grasp mathematical and logical facts.
Theistic Perspective (Optional): As a supplementary note, the author, a theist, adds that belief in God further supports the idea that humans are equipped to discern moral truths—though this point is acknowledged to carry less weight for non-theists.
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Executive summary: This exploratory argument defends moral realism—the view that some moral truths are objective and stance-independent—by asserting that denying such truths leads to implausible and counterintuitive implications, and that our intuitive moral judgments are as epistemically justified as basic logical or perceptual beliefs.
Key points:
Definition and Defense of Moral Realism: The author defines moral realism as the belief in stance-independent moral truths and argues that some moral facts (e.g., the wrongness of torture) are too intuitively compelling to be explained away as subjective or false.
Critique of Anti-Realism’s Consequences: Moral anti-realism, the author argues, implies that even clearly irrational behaviors (e.g., self-harm, extreme sacrifice for trivial desires) are not mistaken as long as they are desired—an implication that runs counter to ordinary moral and rational intuitions.
Epistemology of Moral Beliefs: The author analogizes moral intuition to visual and logical perception, claiming that moral beliefs are justified in the same way as foundational beliefs in other domains—by intellectual appearances that seem self-evident unless strongly refuted.
Rebuttal of Common Objections: The post addresses key arguments against moral realism—such as disagreement, the supposed “queerness” of moral facts, and evolutionary debunking—and contends that these objections either misunderstand objectivity or rely on assumptions inconsistent with other accepted non-physical truths (e.g., logical or epistemic norms).
Moral Knowledge and Evolution: The author argues that our ability to access moral truths is best explained by evolution endowing us with rational faculties that can discover such truths, paralleling our capacity to grasp mathematical and logical facts.
Theistic Perspective (Optional): As a supplementary note, the author, a theist, adds that belief in God further supports the idea that humans are equipped to discern moral truths—though this point is acknowledged to carry less weight for non-theists.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.