Some moral judgements (e.g., pain is bad) certainly strike me as prima facie objectively true. Moreover, I find most arguments against the objectivity of morality very weak (e.g., argument from disagreement). However, I do think that epistemic worries of various kinds (e.g., epistemic access and evolutionary debunking) count against the objectivity of morality. Overall, I would assign somewhat less than 50% probability to the proposition that morality is objective, but the view should nonetheless be taken very seriously.
I think pain is bad, but I don’t think pain is bad independently of what I or anyone thinks about it. I think pain is bad insofar as I don’t like being in pain and don’t want anyone else to be in pain (all else being equal). Why be a realist about the badness of pain, or anything else? While I agree arguments for moral antirealism are typically not very good, I also do not think there are any good arguments for moral realism, nor any particularly good reason to think moral realism is true.
You also say the view should be taken very seriously. Why should it be taken very seriously?
Thanks for the comment! I’ll try to explain briefly what I mean:
I take “pain” (in the morally relevant sense) to be defined by something like “a sensation that you dislike when experiencing it”. In this terminology, all pain is disliked. Whether a person finds a particular experience painful is subjective, but our moral judgement about pain need not be subjective. In fact, it seems to me and many (most?) people that underserved pain (in the aforementioned sense) is bad regardless of what attitudes other people have about such pain. The fact that some proposition seems true obviously does not imply that it is true. However, it does provide evidence in its favour the proposition. Indeed, I think this is how we get most of our knowledge (e.g., we have reasons to believe that there is an objective physical reality because that seems to be the case). (See phenomenological conservatism for a more general statement of this type of epistemology).
In fact, it seems to me and many (most?) people that underserved pain (in the aforementioned sense) is bad regardless of what attitudes other people have about such pain.
I’m a moral antirealist, and I myself think that undeserved pain is bad regardless of what attitudes other people have about such pain. The reason I think such pain is bad is because I disapprove of it. So what you’ve described is completely consistent with antirealism. For comparison, I think pineapple on pizza tastes good regardless of what other people have about it.
What would be required for a person’s stance about this scenario to suggest realism is if they thought that pain was bad regardless of what anyone thought about it, including themselves and the person experiencing the pain. That is, they’d need to think that the pain would be bad even if they didn’t think it was bad and even if the person experiencing the pain didn’t think it was bad. And I don’t think most people think this.
I’m familiar with phenomenal conservatism (I’ve directly discussed moral realism with one of its main proponents, Mike Huemer here, and have written a bit about the topic such as here). I don’t endorse it, but even if I did, I think its frequently misused and isn’t going to do much to support realism. At best, phenomenal conservatism provides one with a private, extra source of “justification” for one’s beliefs, but it has little dialectical force in an argument. The fact that something seems a certain way to you may matter to me a little bit to me, but if it doesn’t seem that way to me (or it seems that the contrary is the case), how things seem to you won’t count for much.
Some moral judgements (e.g., pain is bad) certainly strike me as prima facie objectively true. Moreover, I find most arguments against the objectivity of morality very weak (e.g., argument from disagreement). However, I do think that epistemic worries of various kinds (e.g., epistemic access and evolutionary debunking) count against the objectivity of morality. Overall, I would assign somewhat less than 50% probability to the proposition that morality is objective, but the view should nonetheless be taken very seriously.
I think pain is bad, but I don’t think pain is bad independently of what I or anyone thinks about it. I think pain is bad insofar as I don’t like being in pain and don’t want anyone else to be in pain (all else being equal). Why be a realist about the badness of pain, or anything else? While I agree arguments for moral antirealism are typically not very good, I also do not think there are any good arguments for moral realism, nor any particularly good reason to think moral realism is true.
You also say the view should be taken very seriously. Why should it be taken very seriously?
Thanks for the comment! I’ll try to explain briefly what I mean:
I take “pain” (in the morally relevant sense) to be defined by something like “a sensation that you dislike when experiencing it”. In this terminology, all pain is disliked. Whether a person finds a particular experience painful is subjective, but our moral judgement about pain need not be subjective. In fact, it seems to me and many (most?) people that underserved pain (in the aforementioned sense) is bad regardless of what attitudes other people have about such pain. The fact that some proposition seems true obviously does not imply that it is true. However, it does provide evidence in its favour the proposition. Indeed, I think this is how we get most of our knowledge (e.g., we have reasons to believe that there is an objective physical reality because that seems to be the case). (See phenomenological conservatism for a more general statement of this type of epistemology).
I’m a moral antirealist, and I myself think that undeserved pain is bad regardless of what attitudes other people have about such pain. The reason I think such pain is bad is because I disapprove of it. So what you’ve described is completely consistent with antirealism. For comparison, I think pineapple on pizza tastes good regardless of what other people have about it.
What would be required for a person’s stance about this scenario to suggest realism is if they thought that pain was bad regardless of what anyone thought about it, including themselves and the person experiencing the pain. That is, they’d need to think that the pain would be bad even if they didn’t think it was bad and even if the person experiencing the pain didn’t think it was bad. And I don’t think most people think this.
I’m familiar with phenomenal conservatism (I’ve directly discussed moral realism with one of its main proponents, Mike Huemer here, and have written a bit about the topic such as here). I don’t endorse it, but even if I did, I think its frequently misused and isn’t going to do much to support realism. At best, phenomenal conservatism provides one with a private, extra source of “justification” for one’s beliefs, but it has little dialectical force in an argument. The fact that something seems a certain way to you may matter to me a little bit to me, but if it doesn’t seem that way to me (or it seems that the contrary is the case), how things seem to you won’t count for much.