I’m not an axiological realist, but it seems really helpful to have a term for that position, upvoted.
Broadly, and off-topic-ally, I’m confused why moral philosophers don’t always distinguish between axiology (valuations of states of the world) and morality (how one ought to behave). People seem to frequently talk past each for lack of this distinction. For example, they object to valuing a really large number of moral patients (an axiological claim) on the grounds that doing so would be too demanding (a moral claim). I first learned these terms from https://​​slatestarcodex.com/​​2017/​​08/​​28/​​contra-askell-on-moral-offsets/​​ which I recommend.
I’m not an axiological realist, but it seems really helpful to have a term for that position, upvoted.
Broadly, and off-topic-ally, I’m confused why moral philosophers don’t always distinguish between axiology (valuations of states of the world) and morality (how one ought to behave). People seem to frequently talk past each for lack of this distinction. For example, they object to valuing a really large number of moral patients (an axiological claim) on the grounds that doing so would be too demanding (a moral claim). I first learned these terms from https://​​slatestarcodex.com/​​2017/​​08/​​28/​​contra-askell-on-moral-offsets/​​ which I recommend.