It just seems to be a brute intuition—one that I don’t share.
Indeed.
The central focus on “torturing babies” being objectively wrong (and the not particularly subtle hidden basis that this is all due to the existence of God) is particularly odd as a choice in this forum, which is disproportionately Jewish, where by halakhic law people are required by God to circumcise male babies (and is also just common among Americans in general).
The view that these statements are neither true nor false has unique linguistic problems. Proponents claim that moral sentences are like commands—they’re not even in the business of expressing propositions. If I say “shut the door,” or “go Dodgers,” that isn’t either true nor false. But because of that, it makes no sense to ask “go Dodgers?” or “is it true that shut the door?” Similarly, it makes no sense to say “if shut the door then shut the door now, shut the door, therefore, shut the door now.” But it does make sense to say things like “is abortion wrong?” or “if murder is wrong, then so is abortion.” This shows that moral statements are, at least in many cases, in the business of expressing propositions—asserting things supposed to be true or false.
I’m genuinely surprised that anyone continues to present the argument from grammar. The obvious implied part of those sentences if “I would prefer it if you” before “shut the door”. “Is it true that I would prefer it if you shut the door” makes obvious sense, as does “if I would prefer it if you shut the door then I would prefer it if you shut the door now, I would prefer it if you shut the door, therefore, I would prefer it if you shut the door now”. “Is abortion wrong?” becomes “do you prefer if people not abort?”, “if murder is wrong, then so is abortion” becomes “if you would prefer that people not murder, then I would prefer it if you also prefer people not abort”, et cetera.
These objections are both obvious and well known. Neglecting to address them speaks to the seriousness of this level of engagement with the counterarguments—a pattern I see consistently from proponents of moral realism.
This is a deeply unconvincing post.
Indeed.
The central focus on “torturing babies” being objectively wrong (and the not particularly subtle hidden basis that this is all due to the existence of God) is particularly odd as a choice in this forum, which is disproportionately Jewish, where by halakhic law people are required by God to circumcise male babies (and is also just common among Americans in general).
I’m genuinely surprised that anyone continues to present the argument from grammar. The obvious implied part of those sentences if “I would prefer it if you” before “shut the door”. “Is it true that I would prefer it if you shut the door” makes obvious sense, as does “if I would prefer it if you shut the door then I would prefer it if you shut the door now, I would prefer it if you shut the door, therefore, I would prefer it if you shut the door now”. “Is abortion wrong?” becomes “do you prefer if people not abort?”, “if murder is wrong, then so is abortion” becomes “if you would prefer that people not murder, then I would prefer it if you also prefer people not abort”, et cetera.
These objections are both obvious and well known. Neglecting to address them speaks to the seriousness of this level of engagement with the counterarguments—a pattern I see consistently from proponents of moral realism.