Alastair Norcross is a famous philosopher with similar views. Hereās the argument I once gave him that seemed to convert him (at least on that day) to realism about normative reasons:
First, we can ask whether youād like to give up your Value Realism in favour of a relativistic view on which thereās āhedonistic valueā, ādesire-fulfilment valueā, and āNazi valueā, all metaphysically on a par. If notāif thereās really just one correct view of value, regardless of what subjective standards anyone might arbitrarily endorseāthen we can raise the question of why normative reasons donāt move in parallel. Surely an account of reasons for action that is grounded in facts about whatās genuinely valuable is superior to an alternative account that bears no connection to the true value facts?
This just seems to be question-begging. It just seems to me youāre saying āaxiological realism gives rise to normative realism because surely axiological realism gives rise to normative realismā.
Alastair Norcross is a famous philosopher with similar views. Hereās the argument I once gave him that seemed to convert him (at least on that day) to realism about normative reasons:
This just seems to be question-begging. It just seems to me youāre saying āaxiological realism gives rise to normative realism because surely axiological realism gives rise to normative realismā.