I do not like the expression ‘Morality is objective’, because it comprises both claims I’m very confident are not objective (“You ought not to kill”) and claims I’m very confident are objective (“Suffering is bad”). More generally, I am a moral anti-realist by default, but am forced to recognize that some moral claims are real—specifically, certain axiological claims—because their objective reality is revealed to me via introspection when I have the corresponding phenomenal experiences (such as the experience of being in agony).
Sure, who could possibly believe that all moral propositions are objectively true? My point was that moral realists typically believe that some axiological and some deontic claims are objectively true, and that if you are an anti-realist about the former and a realist about the latter, calling yourself a “moral realist” may fail to communicate your views accurately.
Do you know if there are any good writings on axiological-but-not-deontic realism? I have always found this view quite plausible, but I haven’t seen much discussion of it.
I do not like the expression ‘Morality is objective’, because it comprises both claims I’m very confident are not objective (“You ought not to kill”) and claims I’m very confident are objective (“Suffering is bad”). More generally, I am a moral anti-realist by default, but am forced to recognize that some moral claims are real—specifically, certain axiological claims—because their objective reality is revealed to me via introspection when I have the corresponding phenomenal experiences (such as the experience of being in agony).
Moral realism is just the idea that some moral propositions are objectively true, not that all of them are true.
Sure, who could possibly believe that all moral propositions are objectively true? My point was that moral realists typically believe that some axiological and some deontic claims are objectively true, and that if you are an anti-realist about the former and a realist about the latter, calling yourself a “moral realist” may fail to communicate your views accurately.
Do you know if there are any good writings on axiological-but-not-deontic realism? I have always found this view quite plausible, but I haven’t seen much discussion of it.