No, sorry, I don’t think they’re just stipulating or at least I don’t think they take themselves to be doing so. That’s just an example of how terms can be trivial. Apologies for not being clear about that.
I don’t think naturalists are literally just stipulating terms in this way. But if all they are doing amounts to terminological relabeling, then their account would be trivial in the same respect. If they’re doing more than this, then they’re welcome to offer an account of what that is; it’s going to vary from one account to another but the triviality of naturalist accounts runs deep and takes multiple forms. For instance, if the realist’s account only furnishes us with descriptive facts, then it lacks the sort of normative authority non-naturalist realists try to retain. So we end up with “moral facts” that have no practical relevance. For example, suppose someone says “Moral facts are facts about what increases or decreases wellbeing.”
Even if I granted that this is true, what practical relevance does this have? As far as I can tell: none whatsoever. If naturalists disagree they’re welcome to explain how there is any practical relevance to making such a discovery.
Don’t some naturalists just defend the idea that moral properties could be identical with complex sociological properties without even saying *which* properties
Yes. And you have synthetic naturalist accounts that purport to identify the moral facts with various types of natural facts that aren’t reducible to some kind of analytic claim. This is how I take Sterelny and Fraser’s account. I reject those accounts not for the same reasons as analytic naturalist accounts but but for other reasons, e.g., empirical inadequacy and other forms of triviality.
I’d also say that this only bears on the truth/falsity of naturalism fairly indirectly.
I agree. I’m not necessarily going to insist naturalist accounts are false. I tend to argue for a trilemma: that all versions of moral realism are trivial, false, or unintelligible. I don’t think the worst thing a theory can be is necessary false; triviality can be a problem for an account as well. I should note, too, that I’m a pragmatist, so there’s a sense in which the triviality of an account can collapse into or play a role in its falsehood as well, on my view. But I try not to impose pragmatist preconceptions on others.
Personally I think naturalist accounts of realism “miss the point.” My concern is with rejecting irreducible normativity, external reasons, normative authority, and so on. Naturalist accounts don’t even seem to be in the business of trying to do this.
If you think there might well be forms of naturalism that are true but trivial, is your credence in anti-realism really well over >99%?
This forum probably isn’t the place for really getting into the weeds of this, but I’m also a bit worried about accounts of triviality that conflate a priority or even analyticity and triviality: Maths is not trivial in any sense of “trivial” on which “trivial” means “not worth bothering with”. Maybe you can get out of this by saying maths isn’t analytic and it’s only being analytic that trivializes things, but I don’t think it is particulary obvious that there is a sense making concept of analyticity that doesn’t apply to maths. Apparently Neo-Fregeans think that lots of maths is analytic, and as far as I know that is a respected option in the philosophy of math: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logicism/#NeoFre
I also wonder about exactly what is being claimed to be trivial: individual identifications of moral properties with naturalistic properties, if they are explicitly claimed to be analytic? Or the claim that moral naturalism is true and there are some analytic truths of this sort? Or both?
Also, do you think semantic claims in general are trivial?
Finally, do you think the naturalists whose claims you consider “trivial” mostly agree with you that their views have the features that you think make for triviality but disagree that having those features means their views are of no interest. Or do most of them think their claims lack the features you think make for triviality? Or do you think most of them just haven’t thought about it/don’t have a good-faith substantive response?
These are good questions and reasonable concerns, and I share the sense that this forum may not be ideal for addressing these questions. So I’d be happy to move the discussion away from here. For now, I’ll say a few things. Regarding accounts of triviality conflating a priority or analyticity with triviality: I don’t think I am conflating anything; I do think they’re trivial in the relevant respects. Take a possible naturalist account: moral facts are facts about what increases or decreases wellbeing. Okay, well I already think there are facts about what increases or decreases wellbeing.
What difference does it make if those are moral facts? I have concerns about what that might even mean, but even if I set those aside, what practical difference would this make? As far as the synthetic accounts, I might just reject them on other grounds aside from triviality, but insofar as they also reduce moral claims to descriptive facts, there still looks to me like a kind of triviality there: no set of descriptive facts, in and of themselves, necessarily have any practical relevance to me. In other words, from a practical and motivational perspective, discovering that something is a “moral fact” simply doesn’t make any difference to me, and it’s not clear to me why it would make any difference to anyone else. Suppose, for instance, that someone like Oliver Scott Curry is correct, and that moral facts are facts about what promotes cooperations within groups. Okay. Now what? What do I do with this information?
Maths is not trivial in any sense of “trivial” on which “trivial” means “not worth bothering with”.
I’m not sure the comparison would be apt, given that I think of math as a kind of useful social construction. Math is extremely useful, but it’s useful in a way contingent on our goals and purposes. If we devised moral systems specifically to serve some purpose or goal in the way we did math, I might very well consider them nontrivial...but I’d also be an antirealist about them.
Maybe you can get out of this by saying maths isn’t analytic and it’s only being analytic that trivializes things, but I don’t think it is particulary obvious that there is a sense making concept of analyticity that doesn’t apply to maths
I’m an empiricist and a pragmatist and I think the mathematical systems we develop and use earn their keep through their application to our ends. I don’t think the same is true of naturalist accounts of moral realism. It’d be hard to do many things without math. Conversely, if there were no stance-independent moral facts of the sort naturalists believe in, I struggle to see what difference it would make in principle.
Also, do you think semantic claims in general are trivial?
I’m not sure quite what you have in mind, so I’m not sure.
Finally, do you think the naturalists whose claims you consider “trivial” mostly agree with you that their views have the features that you think make for triviality but disagree that having those features means their views are of no interest.
It depends on which objection I’m raising. That the moral facts are descriptive and lack some of the features non-naturalists claim moral facts have? Yea, probably. That they’re just engaged in a pointless activity of figuring out how English speakers use moral language? Probably not. Since we’re operating on different accounts of truth and probably have other differences in our views, there’s likely to be more fundamental differences, too. I’m not really sure. I should probably just talk to more naturalists and maybe read more contemporary work. FWIW, some of the more traditional antirealists I’ve spoken to don’t share my objections and don’t think they’re on the right track.
Or do you think most of them just haven’t thought about it/don’t have a good-faith substantive response?
I doubt that. Most naturalists have thought about their positions much more than I have, and would probably have a number of corrections to make of my characterization of their views.
No, sorry, I don’t think they’re just stipulating or at least I don’t think they take themselves to be doing so. That’s just an example of how terms can be trivial. Apologies for not being clear about that.
I don’t think naturalists are literally just stipulating terms in this way. But if all they are doing amounts to terminological relabeling, then their account would be trivial in the same respect. If they’re doing more than this, then they’re welcome to offer an account of what that is; it’s going to vary from one account to another but the triviality of naturalist accounts runs deep and takes multiple forms. For instance, if the realist’s account only furnishes us with descriptive facts, then it lacks the sort of normative authority non-naturalist realists try to retain. So we end up with “moral facts” that have no practical relevance. For example, suppose someone says “Moral facts are facts about what increases or decreases wellbeing.”
Even if I granted that this is true, what practical relevance does this have? As far as I can tell: none whatsoever. If naturalists disagree they’re welcome to explain how there is any practical relevance to making such a discovery.
Yes. And you have synthetic naturalist accounts that purport to identify the moral facts with various types of natural facts that aren’t reducible to some kind of analytic claim. This is how I take Sterelny and Fraser’s account. I reject those accounts not for the same reasons as analytic naturalist accounts but but for other reasons, e.g., empirical inadequacy and other forms of triviality.
I agree. I’m not necessarily going to insist naturalist accounts are false. I tend to argue for a trilemma: that all versions of moral realism are trivial, false, or unintelligible. I don’t think the worst thing a theory can be is necessary false; triviality can be a problem for an account as well. I should note, too, that I’m a pragmatist, so there’s a sense in which the triviality of an account can collapse into or play a role in its falsehood as well, on my view. But I try not to impose pragmatist preconceptions on others.
Personally I think naturalist accounts of realism “miss the point.” My concern is with rejecting irreducible normativity, external reasons, normative authority, and so on. Naturalist accounts don’t even seem to be in the business of trying to do this.
If you think there might well be forms of naturalism that are true but trivial, is your credence in anti-realism really well over >99%?
This forum probably isn’t the place for really getting into the weeds of this, but I’m also a bit worried about accounts of triviality that conflate a priority or even analyticity and triviality: Maths is not trivial in any sense of “trivial” on which “trivial” means “not worth bothering with”. Maybe you can get out of this by saying maths isn’t analytic and it’s only being analytic that trivializes things, but I don’t think it is particulary obvious that there is a sense making concept of analyticity that doesn’t apply to maths. Apparently Neo-Fregeans think that lots of maths is analytic, and as far as I know that is a respected option in the philosophy of math: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logicism/#NeoFre
I also wonder about exactly what is being claimed to be trivial: individual identifications of moral properties with naturalistic properties, if they are explicitly claimed to be analytic? Or the claim that moral naturalism is true and there are some analytic truths of this sort? Or both?
Also, do you think semantic claims in general are trivial?
Finally, do you think the naturalists whose claims you consider “trivial” mostly agree with you that their views have the features that you think make for triviality but disagree that having those features means their views are of no interest. Or do most of them think their claims lack the features you think make for triviality? Or do you think most of them just haven’t thought about it/don’t have a good-faith substantive response?
These are good questions and reasonable concerns, and I share the sense that this forum may not be ideal for addressing these questions. So I’d be happy to move the discussion away from here. For now, I’ll say a few things. Regarding accounts of triviality conflating a priority or analyticity with triviality: I don’t think I am conflating anything; I do think they’re trivial in the relevant respects. Take a possible naturalist account: moral facts are facts about what increases or decreases wellbeing. Okay, well I already think there are facts about what increases or decreases wellbeing.
What difference does it make if those are moral facts? I have concerns about what that might even mean, but even if I set those aside, what practical difference would this make? As far as the synthetic accounts, I might just reject them on other grounds aside from triviality, but insofar as they also reduce moral claims to descriptive facts, there still looks to me like a kind of triviality there: no set of descriptive facts, in and of themselves, necessarily have any practical relevance to me. In other words, from a practical and motivational perspective, discovering that something is a “moral fact” simply doesn’t make any difference to me, and it’s not clear to me why it would make any difference to anyone else. Suppose, for instance, that someone like Oliver Scott Curry is correct, and that moral facts are facts about what promotes cooperations within groups. Okay. Now what? What do I do with this information?
I’m not sure the comparison would be apt, given that I think of math as a kind of useful social construction. Math is extremely useful, but it’s useful in a way contingent on our goals and purposes. If we devised moral systems specifically to serve some purpose or goal in the way we did math, I might very well consider them nontrivial...but I’d also be an antirealist about them.
I’m an empiricist and a pragmatist and I think the mathematical systems we develop and use earn their keep through their application to our ends. I don’t think the same is true of naturalist accounts of moral realism. It’d be hard to do many things without math. Conversely, if there were no stance-independent moral facts of the sort naturalists believe in, I struggle to see what difference it would make in principle.
I’m not sure quite what you have in mind, so I’m not sure.
It depends on which objection I’m raising. That the moral facts are descriptive and lack some of the features non-naturalists claim moral facts have? Yea, probably. That they’re just engaged in a pointless activity of figuring out how English speakers use moral language? Probably not. Since we’re operating on different accounts of truth and probably have other differences in our views, there’s likely to be more fundamental differences, too. I’m not really sure. I should probably just talk to more naturalists and maybe read more contemporary work. FWIW, some of the more traditional antirealists I’ve spoken to don’t share my objections and don’t think they’re on the right track.
I doubt that. Most naturalists have thought about their positions much more than I have, and would probably have a number of corrections to make of my characterization of their views.