My grounds for this are the relatively-basic ones: it certainly seems, for example, that some choices are plain irrational or that some states-of-affairs are bad in a stance-independent way
Seems that way to who? It does not seem that way to me. If I had to say how things “seemed,” I’d say it seems to me that this is not the case.
And of course, robust realists will always point to the partners-in-crime of moral facts, in other kinds of a priori domains.
They do, but I don’t find these arguments even a little convincing. I don’t see any good reasons to be a normative realist in any nonmoral domains, either.
Personally, I think there are very serious problems with people relying so heavily on how much things seem to them. Among other issues, I don’t think there are good ways to resolve conflicts if things seem differently to others.
Seems that way to who? It does not seem that way to me. If I had to say how things “seemed,” I’d say it seems to me that this is not the case.
They do, but I don’t find these arguments even a little convincing. I don’t see any good reasons to be a normative realist in any nonmoral domains, either.
Personally, I think there are very serious problems with people relying so heavily on how much things seem to them. Among other issues, I don’t think there are good ways to resolve conflicts if things seem differently to others.