I’m also very sympathetic to a preference utilitarian perspective, much more so than just suffering vs. happiness. But to me the preference satisfaction comes from the realised state of the world actually being as desired, and not from specifically experiencing that satisfaction. For example, people will willingly die in the name of furthering a cause they want to see realised, knowing full well they will not experience it. One would consider it something of a compensation for their sacrifice if their goals are realised after, or especially because of, their death.
Similarly, I think it would help to right past wrongs if, in the future, the past person’s desired state of the world comes to pass. But I still don’t see how it is any better for that person, or somehow corrected further, if some replica of their self experiences it.
One might imagine that the overall state of the world is more positive because there is this replica that is really ecstatic about their preferences being realised and being able to experience it, but specifically in terms of righting the wrong I don’t think it has added anything. They are not the same subject as the one who experienced the wrong—so it does not correct for their specific experience—and the payout is in any case in the realised state of the world and not in that past subject having to experience it.
Similarly, I think it would help to right past wrongs if, in the future, the past person’s desired state of the world comes to pass. But I still don’t see how it is any better for that person, or somehow corrected further, if some replica of their self experiences it.
I think where my intuitions diverge is that I expect many people to have a lot of self-directed preferences that I regard as ethically on the same footing as non-self directed preferences: It seems you’re mostly considering states of the world like ensuring the survival and flourishing of their loved ones, or justice happening for crimes against humanity, or an evil government being overthrown and replaced by a democracy. But I’d guess this class of preferences should not be so distinct from people wanting the state of the world in future including themselves being happy, with a loving partner and family, friends and a community that holds him or her in high regard. And that’s why I feel like a past person would feel at least a little redeemed if they knew that in some future time they would see themselves living the fulfilled live that the past selves wished they could’ve enjoyed.
Ah I see, yes that seems to make a meaningful difference regarding the need to have the self experience it then. Although I would still question if having the replica achieves this. If we go to the clone example, if I clone you now with all your thoughts and desires and you remain unsatisfied, but I tell you that your clone is—contemporaneous with your continued existence—living a life in which all your desires are satisfied, would you find that satisfying? For me at least that would not be satisfying or reassuring at all. I don’t see a principled way in which stretching the replication process over time so that you no longer exist when the copy is created suddenly changes this. The preference would seem to be that the person’s subjective experience is different in the ways that they hope for, but all that is being done is creating an additional and alternative subjective experience that is like theirs, which experiences the good things instead.
Yeah, I think it’s a good point that stretching the replication process over time seems kind of arbitrary and might making the existence of the replica and yourself contemporaneous reduces the intuition that it is “you” who gets to live the life you wished for.
At the same time my personal intuitions (which are often different from other reasonable people :D) are actually not reduced much by the thought of a replicated copy of myself living at the same time. E.g. if I now think about a 1:1 copy of mine living a fullfilled life with his wife and children in a “parallel universe”, I feel more deeply happy about this than thinking about the same scenario for friends or strangers.
Ha well, I think you might find a fair few people share your intuition, especially in some strands of EA that intersect with transhumanism.
I don’t personally share the intuition, but I think if I did then it would also make sense to me that I would expect the replica’s satisfaction would be correspondingly reduced to the extent they know some other self that they are identified with is or was not satisfied. But I appreciate at this point we’re just getting to conflicting intuitions!
I’m also very sympathetic to a preference utilitarian perspective, much more so than just suffering vs. happiness. But to me the preference satisfaction comes from the realised state of the world actually being as desired, and not from specifically experiencing that satisfaction. For example, people will willingly die in the name of furthering a cause they want to see realised, knowing full well they will not experience it. One would consider it something of a compensation for their sacrifice if their goals are realised after, or especially because of, their death.
Similarly, I think it would help to right past wrongs if, in the future, the past person’s desired state of the world comes to pass. But I still don’t see how it is any better for that person, or somehow corrected further, if some replica of their self experiences it.
One might imagine that the overall state of the world is more positive because there is this replica that is really ecstatic about their preferences being realised and being able to experience it, but specifically in terms of righting the wrong I don’t think it has added anything. They are not the same subject as the one who experienced the wrong—so it does not correct for their specific experience—and the payout is in any case in the realised state of the world and not in that past subject having to experience it.
I think where my intuitions diverge is that I expect many people to have a lot of self-directed preferences that I regard as ethically on the same footing as non-self directed preferences: It seems you’re mostly considering states of the world like ensuring the survival and flourishing of their loved ones, or justice happening for crimes against humanity, or an evil government being overthrown and replaced by a democracy. But I’d guess this class of preferences should not be so distinct from people wanting the state of the world in future including themselves being happy, with a loving partner and family, friends and a community that holds him or her in high regard. And that’s why I feel like a past person would feel at least a little redeemed if they knew that in some future time they would see themselves living the fulfilled live that the past selves wished they could’ve enjoyed.
Ah I see, yes that seems to make a meaningful difference regarding the need to have the self experience it then. Although I would still question if having the replica achieves this. If we go to the clone example, if I clone you now with all your thoughts and desires and you remain unsatisfied, but I tell you that your clone is—contemporaneous with your continued existence—living a life in which all your desires are satisfied, would you find that satisfying? For me at least that would not be satisfying or reassuring at all. I don’t see a principled way in which stretching the replication process over time so that you no longer exist when the copy is created suddenly changes this. The preference would seem to be that the person’s subjective experience is different in the ways that they hope for, but all that is being done is creating an additional and alternative subjective experience that is like theirs, which experiences the good things instead.
Yeah, I think it’s a good point that stretching the replication process over time seems kind of arbitrary and might making the existence of the replica and yourself contemporaneous reduces the intuition that it is “you” who gets to live the life you wished for.
At the same time my personal intuitions (which are often different from other reasonable people :D) are actually not reduced much by the thought of a replicated copy of myself living at the same time. E.g. if I now think about a 1:1 copy of mine living a fullfilled life with his wife and children in a “parallel universe”, I feel more deeply happy about this than thinking about the same scenario for friends or strangers.
Ha well, I think you might find a fair few people share your intuition, especially in some strands of EA that intersect with transhumanism.
I don’t personally share the intuition, but I think if I did then it would also make sense to me that I would expect the replica’s satisfaction would be correspondingly reduced to the extent they know some other self that they are identified with is or was not satisfied. But I appreciate at this point we’re just getting to conflicting intuitions!