Thanks. You make the point well that partitioning can be arbitrary. However, my proposed approach is not to partition consequences, but to consider significant reasons. Particular causal facts can generate reasons wherever the causal and evaluative evidence supports them: saving the child gives a reason for AMF; additional farmed-animal suffering gives a reason against; other consequences may generate further reasons. The hard question is then how to weigh these reasons, and this may remain indeterminate.
So I think the decomposition problem is serious for bracketing approaches that need to choose a privileged set of value locations. A reasons-based approach may avoid that requirement, though it leaves the question of how reasons are individuated and weighed.
I share your concern about the meat-eating problem. In my example it is not just a speculative possibility as there is a clear causal route from saving human lives to increased animal consumption.
Thanks. You make the point well that partitioning can be arbitrary. However, my proposed approach is not to partition consequences, but to consider significant reasons. Particular causal facts can generate reasons wherever the causal and evaluative evidence supports them: saving the child gives a reason for AMF; additional farmed-animal suffering gives a reason against; other consequences may generate further reasons. The hard question is then how to weigh these reasons, and this may remain indeterminate.
So I think the decomposition problem is serious for bracketing approaches that need to choose a privileged set of value locations. A reasons-based approach may avoid that requirement, though it leaves the question of how reasons are individuated and weighed.
I share your concern about the meat-eating problem. In my example it is not just a speculative possibility as there is a clear causal route from saving human lives to increased animal consumption.