Executive summary: This speculative post explores whether primitive sentient organisms can experience extremely intense pain by disentangling two independent dimensions of affective experience—intensity range and resolution—proposing an evolutionary framework with four possible trajectories and highlighting the ethical importance of determining which organisms might suffer at morally concerning levels.
Key points:
Main question reframed: Instead of asking whether primitive animals feel pain, the post asks whether they can experience extremely intense pain or finely discriminate between pain intensities—or both—framing this as an evolutionary optimization problem in affective signaling.
Two dimensions of pain systems: The authors define intensity range (how extreme pain can be) and resolution (how finely an organism distinguishes between intensities) as independent variables, each incurring different neurobiological costs and subject to distinct evolutionary pressures.
Four evolutionary scenarios: They propose four hypothetical affective configurations—Low-Intensity/Low-Resolution (LiLr), High-Intensity/Low-Resolution (HiLr), Low-Intensity/High-Resolution (LiHr), and High-Intensity/High-Resolution (HiHr)—each with different implications for the subjective experiences of early sentient organisms.
Welfare implications: If early sentient organisms evolved along a high-intensity trajectory (HiLr or HiHr), they may be capable of suffering at levels comparable to humans, which would significantly expand our moral obligations to include many more species (e.g., insects, crustaceans).
Empirical directions: The authors suggest two research paths—behavioral complexity analysis and neuroenergetic assessment—to estimate the resolution and intensity of pain systems in primitive organisms, while acknowledging current uncertainty and the need for further data.
Interim stance: While the framework allows for the possibility that primitive organisms feel excruciating pain, the authors treat this as a temporary assumption pending better evidence, emphasizing the need for cautious interpretation in practical applications like animal welfare policy.
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Executive summary: This speculative post explores whether primitive sentient organisms can experience extremely intense pain by disentangling two independent dimensions of affective experience—intensity range and resolution—proposing an evolutionary framework with four possible trajectories and highlighting the ethical importance of determining which organisms might suffer at morally concerning levels.
Key points:
Main question reframed: Instead of asking whether primitive animals feel pain, the post asks whether they can experience extremely intense pain or finely discriminate between pain intensities—or both—framing this as an evolutionary optimization problem in affective signaling.
Two dimensions of pain systems: The authors define intensity range (how extreme pain can be) and resolution (how finely an organism distinguishes between intensities) as independent variables, each incurring different neurobiological costs and subject to distinct evolutionary pressures.
Four evolutionary scenarios: They propose four hypothetical affective configurations—Low-Intensity/Low-Resolution (LiLr), High-Intensity/Low-Resolution (HiLr), Low-Intensity/High-Resolution (LiHr), and High-Intensity/High-Resolution (HiHr)—each with different implications for the subjective experiences of early sentient organisms.
Welfare implications: If early sentient organisms evolved along a high-intensity trajectory (HiLr or HiHr), they may be capable of suffering at levels comparable to humans, which would significantly expand our moral obligations to include many more species (e.g., insects, crustaceans).
Empirical directions: The authors suggest two research paths—behavioral complexity analysis and neuroenergetic assessment—to estimate the resolution and intensity of pain systems in primitive organisms, while acknowledging current uncertainty and the need for further data.
Interim stance: While the framework allows for the possibility that primitive organisms feel excruciating pain, the authors treat this as a temporary assumption pending better evidence, emphasizing the need for cautious interpretation in practical applications like animal welfare policy.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.