Iâm not sure I understand: on one side, we have a stronger obligation to those close to us, but on another side, it is good to help strangers that are thousands of kilometers away? Iâm also not sure why you draw the line at animals.
I personally think that it is good to help strangers thousands of kilometers awayâand it is good that you do so (congrats, by the way!). I also understand that helping our family or friends is importantâwhich is why I help them too.
The argument often put forward is not that you shouldnât help people in your country, but that itâs much more tractable to help people in poor countries. You can help more people for the same amount of resources. The same goes for animals.
I also read sections of your link and skimmed through the rest, but I donât see any justification that relates to the idea that helping animals is misguided. It says that moral values can regress/âprogress, and this depends on the physical and cultural context (which is true). The conclusion is that we shouldnât just expect moral values to change automaticallyâbut that just means that we should devote our efforts to actions that donât rely on this assumption. For instance, supporting alternative proteins that are cheaper and tastier can reduce the cost of acting morally.
I also read sections of your link and skimmed through the rest, but I donât see any justification that relates to the idea that helping animals is misguided.
The argument of the link is that moral progress has sometimes meant correctly regarding some previous moral concern as unnecessary or based on false belief. I think the relevance here is to resist the idea that moral concern for animals must be correct by a âmore moral concern is always betterâ heuristic.
(I think itâs a useful argument to have in mind, but I think we have much better reasons to be morally concerned about animals.)
Iâm not sure I understand: on one side, we have a stronger obligation to those close to us, but on another side, it is good to help strangers that are thousands of kilometers away
I donât see how this is contradictory? For example, you might prefer saving 10 American lives to saving 11 non-American lives, but prefer saving 100 non-American lives to 5 American lives.
That and the anti-expanding moral circle argument suggests that itâs OK (and in fact, in my opinion, good) to assign different weights to different entities.
But in that case, if scale is a very important metric, shouldnât helping animals also be a good idea? Itâs possible to help thousands of them for a fraction of the cost required to save one non-Amerian life.
Iâm not sure I understand: on one side, we have a stronger obligation to those close to us, but on another side, it is good to help strangers that are thousands of kilometers away? Iâm also not sure why you draw the line at animals.
I personally think that it is good to help strangers thousands of kilometers awayâand it is good that you do so (congrats, by the way!). I also understand that helping our family or friends is importantâwhich is why I help them too.
The argument often put forward is not that you shouldnât help people in your country, but that itâs much more tractable to help people in poor countries. You can help more people for the same amount of resources. The same goes for animals.
I also read sections of your link and skimmed through the rest, but I donât see any justification that relates to the idea that helping animals is misguided.
It says that moral values can regress/âprogress, and this depends on the physical and cultural context (which is true). The conclusion is that we shouldnât just expect moral values to change automaticallyâbut that just means that we should devote our efforts to actions that donât rely on this assumption. For instance, supporting alternative proteins that are cheaper and tastier can reduce the cost of acting morally.
The argument of the link is that moral progress has sometimes meant correctly regarding some previous moral concern as unnecessary or based on false belief. I think the relevance here is to resist the idea that moral concern for animals must be correct by a âmore moral concern is always betterâ heuristic.
(I think itâs a useful argument to have in mind, but I think we have much better reasons to be morally concerned about animals.)
Okay, I see. In that case, I tend to agree with your (Benâs) position on that topic.
I donât see how this is contradictory? For example, you might prefer saving 10 American lives to saving 11 non-American lives, but prefer saving 100 non-American lives to 5 American lives.
That and the anti-expanding moral circle argument suggests that itâs OK (and in fact, in my opinion, good) to assign different weights to different entities.
Oh, ok, I see.
But in that case, if scale is a very important metric, shouldnât helping animals also be a good idea? Itâs possible to help thousands of them for a fraction of the cost required to save one non-Amerian life.