I think you, Adam, and Oli covered a lot of the relevant points.
I’d add that the LTFF’s decision-making is based on the average score vote from the different fund managers, which would allow for grants to go through in scenarios where one person is very excited, and others aren’t very unexcited or against the grant. I.e., the mechanism allows an excited minority to make a grant that wouldn’t be approved by the majority of the committee. Overall, the mechanism strikes me as near-optimal. (Perhaps we should lower the threshold for making grants a bit further.)
I do think the LTFF might be slightly too risk-averse, and splitting the LTFF into a “legible longtermist fund” and a “judgment-driven longtermist fund” to remove pressure from donors towards the legible version seems a good idea and is tentatively on the roadmap.
I think you, Adam, and Oli covered a lot of the relevant points.
I’d add that the LTFF’s decision-making is based on the average score vote from the different fund managers, which would allow for grants to go through in scenarios where one person is very excited, and others aren’t very unexcited or against the grant. I.e., the mechanism allows an excited minority to make a grant that wouldn’t be approved by the majority of the committee. Overall, the mechanism strikes me as near-optimal. (Perhaps we should lower the threshold for making grants a bit further.)
I do think the LTFF might be slightly too risk-averse, and splitting the LTFF into a “legible longtermist fund” and a “judgment-driven longtermist fund” to remove pressure from donors towards the legible version seems a good idea and is tentatively on the roadmap.