Once the genie is out of the bottle, it doesn’t matter, does it? Much of China’s current tech achievements began with industrial espionage. You can’t constrain a game-changing technology while excluding espionage as a factor.
It’s exactly the same issue with AI.
While you have an interesting theoretical concept, there’s no way to derive a strategy from it that would lead to AI safety that I can see.
The idea for this particular theory of victory is that, if some country (for example, the US) develops TAI first, it could use TAI to prevent other countries (for example, China) from developing TAI as well — including via espionage.
If TAI grants a decisive strategic advantage, then it follows that such a monopoly could be effectively enforced (for example, it’s plausible that TAI-enabled cybersecurity would effectively protect against non-TAI cyberoffense).
Again, I’m not necessarily endorsing this ToV. But it does seem plausible.
Once the genie is out of the bottle, it doesn’t matter, does it? Much of China’s current tech achievements began with industrial espionage. You can’t constrain a game-changing technology while excluding espionage as a factor.
It’s exactly the same issue with AI.
While you have an interesting theoretical concept, there’s no way to derive a strategy from it that would lead to AI safety that I can see.
The idea for this particular theory of victory is that, if some country (for example, the US) develops TAI first, it could use TAI to prevent other countries (for example, China) from developing TAI as well — including via espionage.
If TAI grants a decisive strategic advantage, then it follows that such a monopoly could be effectively enforced (for example, it’s plausible that TAI-enabled cybersecurity would effectively protect against non-TAI cyberoffense).
Again, I’m not necessarily endorsing this ToV. But it does seem plausible.