I think the archer metaphor makes sense only if you accept moral realism. To an anti-realist, moral rules are just guides to ethical behavior. If naïve utilitarianism is a bad guide, and “following reliable rules” a good one, then why pretend that you’re maximizing utility at all?
I don’t see how metaethics makes any difference here. Why couldn’t an anti-realist similarly distinguish between (i) their moral goals, and (ii) the instrumental question of how best to achieve said goals? (To pursue goals in a prudent, non-naive way, is not at all to mean that you are merely “pretending” to have those goals!)
E.g. you could, in principle, have two anti-realists who endorsed exactly the same decision-procedure, but did so for different reasons. (Say one cared intrinsically about the rules, while the other followed rules for purely instrumental reasons.) I think it makes sense to say that these two anti-realists have different fundamental values, even though they agree in practice.
I think the archer metaphor makes sense only if you accept moral realism. To an anti-realist, moral rules are just guides to ethical behavior. If naïve utilitarianism is a bad guide, and “following reliable rules” a good one, then why pretend that you’re maximizing utility at all?
I don’t see how metaethics makes any difference here. Why couldn’t an anti-realist similarly distinguish between (i) their moral goals, and (ii) the instrumental question of how best to achieve said goals? (To pursue goals in a prudent, non-naive way, is not at all to mean that you are merely “pretending” to have those goals!)
E.g. you could, in principle, have two anti-realists who endorsed exactly the same decision-procedure, but did so for different reasons. (Say one cared intrinsically about the rules, while the other followed rules for purely instrumental reasons.) I think it makes sense to say that these two anti-realists have different fundamental values, even though they agree in practice.