Hereās how Iād think about ā4 My argumentā, in actualist preference-affecting terms[1]:
My preferences will differ between pressing button 1 and not pressing button 1, because my preferences track the worldās[2] preferences[3], and the worldās preferences will differ by Frankās. Then:
If I know ahead of time that if I press button 1, I will definitely press button 2 (because I will take Frankās interests into account), then, by backward induction, my options at the start are actually just pressing both and pressing neither. If I press neither button, itās not worse to Bob, and Frank wonāt exist, so it wonāt actually be worse to him either. So pressing button 1 is not better or obligatory, because if I donāt press it, itās not worse to anyone. This matches the permissibility of not pressing a button that has the net effects of 1 and 2 together.
If I know ahead of time thereās some chance I wonāt press button 2 even if I press button 1, then pressing button 1 is better, because it would be worse in expectation to Bob if I didnāt.
Or also desires, likes, dislikes, approval, disapproval, pleasures in things, displeasures in things, evaluative attitudes, etc., as in Really radical empathy.
Hereās how Iād think about ā4 My argumentā, in actualist preference-affecting terms[1]:
My preferences will differ between pressing button 1 and not pressing button 1, because my preferences track the worldās[2] preferences[3], and the worldās preferences will differ by Frankās. Then:
If I know ahead of time that if I press button 1, I will definitely press button 2 (because I will take Frankās interests into account), then, by backward induction, my options at the start are actually just pressing both and pressing neither. If I press neither button, itās not worse to Bob, and Frank wonāt exist, so it wonāt actually be worse to him either. So pressing button 1 is not better or obligatory, because if I donāt press it, itās not worse to anyone. This matches the permissibility of not pressing a button that has the net effects of 1 and 2 together.
If I know ahead of time thereās some chance I wonāt press button 2 even if I press button 1, then pressing button 1 is better, because it would be worse in expectation to Bob if I didnāt.
See this piece for more on actualist preference-affecting views.
Past, current and future, or just current and future.
Or also desires, likes, dislikes, approval, disapproval, pleasures in things, displeasures in things, evaluative attitudes, etc., as in Really radical empathy.