I think you’re right that “FTX Philantrophy” was acting as a regrantor of FTX funds, and that doesn’t protect its grantees. However, the fact that FTX Philantrophy isn’t in the bankruptcy filing could be relevant. It might mean that the 90-day clock started when an entity in the bankruptcy transferred funds to FTX Philantrophy. I am unclear on whether a court would see FTX Philantrophy as an insider for purposes of 11 USC 547.
More generally, the exact origin/flow of funds could potentially be a total defense in some cases. For instance, the Future Fund announcement hinted that some funds might come through a FTX employee’s DAF. Payments to an employee for services rendered are often not recoverable in a preference action for several different reasons. And AFAIK no FTX employee has filed for bankruptcy. So hypothetically, if the chain were FTX → employee → DAF → EA grantee, the FTX → employee transfer might not be subject to clawback, which would render the EA grantee safe.
I think you’re right that “FTX Philantrophy” was acting as a regrantor of FTX funds, and that doesn’t protect its grantees. However, the fact that FTX Philantrophy isn’t in the bankruptcy filing could be relevant. It might mean that the 90-day clock started when an entity in the bankruptcy transferred funds to FTX Philantrophy. I am unclear on whether a court would see FTX Philantrophy as an insider for purposes of 11 USC 547.
More generally, the exact origin/flow of funds could potentially be a total defense in some cases. For instance, the Future Fund announcement hinted that some funds might come through a FTX employee’s DAF. Payments to an employee for services rendered are often not recoverable in a preference action for several different reasons. And AFAIK no FTX employee has filed for bankruptcy. So hypothetically, if the chain were FTX → employee → DAF → EA grantee, the FTX → employee transfer might not be subject to clawback, which would render the EA grantee safe.