This is an interesting idea and I think should be discussed in some detail.
I am interested though in the trade offs between better governance and the sort of governance that might stop people giving at all.
So, for examples, I saw a good post saying that a reform could be “anyone asked to join a new funding vehicle could demand and audit and, if the funder refuses the audit, they should refuse to join and criticise it publicly and discourage other people from joining.”
That seems very likely to stop FTX recurring; but also very likely to stop any UHNW investment in EA directly. So the question is ‘what governance hurdles decrease risk but don’t constitute a total barrier to entry?’
I wonder if submitting capital to your proposal seems a bit too much like the latter.
(Incidentally, I realise that asking ‘what might a bad actor agree to?’ is a slippery slope when deciding on what checks and balances to employ—but I think things like ‘mega donors have to have an independent Board with financial and governance expertise, and register a charitable vehicle’ is possibly a better balance than ‘UHNWs need to let the crowd vet their giving decisions.’)
So the question is ‘what governance hurdles decrease risk but don’t constitute a total barrier to entry?’
I agree. There are probably some kinds of democratic checks that honest UHNW individuals don’t mind, but have relatively big improvements for epistemics and community risk. Perhaps there are ways to add incentives for agreeing to audits or democratic checks? It seems like SBF’s reputation as a businessman benefited somewhat from his association with EA (I am not too confident in this claim). Perhaps offering some kind of “Super Effective Philanthropist” title/prize/trophy to particular UHNW donors that agree to subject their donations to democratic checks or financial audits might be an incentive? (I’m pretty skeptical, but unsure.) I’d like to do some more creative thinking here.
I wonder if submitting capital to your proposal seems a bit too much like the latter.
Thanks for this Zachary.
This is an interesting idea and I think should be discussed in some detail.
I am interested though in the trade offs between better governance and the sort of governance that might stop people giving at all.
So, for examples, I saw a good post saying that a reform could be “anyone asked to join a new funding vehicle could demand and audit and, if the funder refuses the audit, they should refuse to join and criticise it publicly and discourage other people from joining.”
That seems very likely to stop FTX recurring; but also very likely to stop any UHNW investment in EA directly. So the question is ‘what governance hurdles decrease risk but don’t constitute a total barrier to entry?’
I wonder if submitting capital to your proposal seems a bit too much like the latter.
(Incidentally, I realise that asking ‘what might a bad actor agree to?’ is a slippery slope when deciding on what checks and balances to employ—but I think things like ‘mega donors have to have an independent Board with financial and governance expertise, and register a charitable vehicle’ is possibly a better balance than ‘UHNWs need to let the crowd vet their giving decisions.’)
I agree. There are probably some kinds of democratic checks that honest UHNW individuals don’t mind, but have relatively big improvements for epistemics and community risk. Perhaps there are ways to add incentives for agreeing to audits or democratic checks? It seems like SBF’s reputation as a businessman benefited somewhat from his association with EA (I am not too confident in this claim). Perhaps offering some kind of “Super Effective Philanthropist” title/prize/trophy to particular UHNW donors that agree to subject their donations to democratic checks or financial audits might be an incentive? (I’m pretty skeptical, but unsure.) I’d like to do some more creative thinking here.
Probably.