Hi. You tested prior distributions for the probability of consciousness with means ranging from 10 % (= 1/(1 + 9)) for “low” to 90 % (= 9/(1 + 9)) for “high”. I feel like this underestimates the uncertainty considering “The choice of a prior is often somewhat arbitrary”. Have you considered testing prior distributions with means ranging, for example, from 10^-6 to 99.999 %? Relatedly, how much would the uncertainty increase if you had considered a wider range of possible updates via allowing for stronger levels of support and demandingness, whose corresponding likelohood ratios range from 2 % (= 1⁄50) to 50 (from Table 2 of the report)? I worry the range of results one gets is overwhelmingly determined by the range of priors and updates. I suspect the final probabilities of consciousness with span many orders of magnitude for priors with means ranging from 10^-6 to 99.999 %, and possible updates with likelihood ratios randing from 10^-6 to 10^6. You focus on updates in the probability of consciousness in light of the evidence, not on the values of the probability of consciousness. However, it might be better to neglect these even more.
Hi. You tested prior distributions for the probability of consciousness with means ranging from 10 % (= 1/(1 + 9)) for “low” to 90 % (= 9/(1 + 9)) for “high”. I feel like this underestimates the uncertainty considering “The choice of a prior is often somewhat arbitrary”. Have you considered testing prior distributions with means ranging, for example, from 10^-6 to 99.999 %? Relatedly, how much would the uncertainty increase if you had considered a wider range of possible updates via allowing for stronger levels of support and demandingness, whose corresponding likelohood ratios range from 2 % (= 1⁄50) to 50 (from Table 2 of the report)? I worry the range of results one gets is overwhelmingly determined by the range of priors and updates. I suspect the final probabilities of consciousness with span many orders of magnitude for priors with means ranging from 10^-6 to 99.999 %, and possible updates with likelihood ratios randing from 10^-6 to 10^6. You focus on updates in the probability of consciousness in light of the evidence, not on the values of the probability of consciousness. However, it might be better to neglect these even more.