There is a subsection of animal advocates in effective altruism who are concerned that a far future in which anti-speciesism isn’t prevalent isn’t a worthy future. If that’s a confusing wording, let Brian Tomasik, a thought leader in such circles, to explain. From “Risks From Astronomical Future Suffering” [emphasis mine]:
It’s far from clear that human values will shape an Earth-based space-colonization wave, but even if they do, it seems more likely that space colonization will increase total suffering rather than decrease it. That said, other people care a lot about humanity’s survival and spread into the cosmos, so I think suffering reducers should let others pursue their spacefaring dreams in exchange for stronger safety measures against future suffering. In general, I encourage people to focus on making an intergalactic future more humane if it happens rather than making sure there will be an intergalactic future.
Thus, whatever charity can most effectively spread anti-speciesism, or other value-systems for reducing suffering, would be considered the most effective charity overall. If the most effective way to spread the anti-speciesist meme is an ACE-recommended charity spreading an animal-free diet, it is, by some lights, legitimately the most effective charity for far-future considerations. Again, to clarify, this wouldn’t be perceived as a rationalization of convergence on specious grounds. It follows from a simple chain of reasoning that getting as many of the humans as possible who will steer the far future to care about non-human suffering, so they’ll be inclined to prevent it rather than let it happen.
I just wanted to clarify there are some animal advocates in this community who believe promoting animal welfare is the best for the far future, not because it ensures human survival, but because it prevents the worst outcomes of human survival. This is different from the example provided above. One might consider this a niche position in effective altruism. On the other hand, multiple organizations out of Basel, Switzerland, supported by the Effective Altruism Foundation, are heavily influenced by the work of Brian Tomasik and allied colleagues. I don’t know good data on how prevalent these concerns are, across all of effective altruism, or specifically among those who prioritize animal welfare/anti-specieism.
There is a subsection of animal advocates in effective altruism who are concerned that a far future in which anti-speciesism isn’t prevalent isn’t a worthy future. If that’s a confusing wording, let Brian Tomasik, a thought leader in such circles, to explain. From “Risks From Astronomical Future Suffering” [emphasis mine]:
Thus, whatever charity can most effectively spread anti-speciesism, or other value-systems for reducing suffering, would be considered the most effective charity overall. If the most effective way to spread the anti-speciesist meme is an ACE-recommended charity spreading an animal-free diet, it is, by some lights, legitimately the most effective charity for far-future considerations. Again, to clarify, this wouldn’t be perceived as a rationalization of convergence on specious grounds. It follows from a simple chain of reasoning that getting as many of the humans as possible who will steer the far future to care about non-human suffering, so they’ll be inclined to prevent it rather than let it happen.
I just wanted to clarify there are some animal advocates in this community who believe promoting animal welfare is the best for the far future, not because it ensures human survival, but because it prevents the worst outcomes of human survival. This is different from the example provided above. One might consider this a niche position in effective altruism. On the other hand, multiple organizations out of Basel, Switzerland, supported by the Effective Altruism Foundation, are heavily influenced by the work of Brian Tomasik and allied colleagues. I don’t know good data on how prevalent these concerns are, across all of effective altruism, or specifically among those who prioritize animal welfare/anti-specieism.
Your point is very much related to the argument that reducing anti-speciesism decreases s-risk.