I enjoyed reading the paper but was unconvinced any serious problem was being raised (rather than merely a perception of a problem resulting from a misunderstanding).
Put very simply, the structure of the original case is that person chooses option B instead of option A because new information makes option B look better in expectation. It then turns out that option A, despite having lower expected value, produced the outcome with higher value. But there’s nothing mysterious about this: it happens all the time and provides no challenge to expected value theory or act utilitarianism. The fact that I would have won if I’d put all my money on number 16 at the roulette table does not mean I was mistaken not to do so.
I enjoyed reading the paper but was unconvinced any serious problem was being raised (rather than merely a perception of a problem resulting from a misunderstanding).
Put very simply, the structure of the original case is that person chooses option B instead of option A because new information makes option B look better in expectation. It then turns out that option A, despite having lower expected value, produced the outcome with higher value. But there’s nothing mysterious about this: it happens all the time and provides no challenge to expected value theory or act utilitarianism. The fact that I would have won if I’d put all my money on number 16 at the roulette table does not mean I was mistaken not to do so.