Itâs more circumstantial if they prioritize you based on impartial concern; it just happened to be the best thing they could do.
Hm, to my ear, prioritizing a friend just because you happen to be biased towards them is more circumstantial. Itâs based on accidents of geography and life events that led you to be friends with that person to a greater degree than with other people youâve never met.
thatâs pretty small compared to the impartial stakes we face
I agree, though thatâs a separate argument. I was addressing the claim that conditional on a consequentialist choosing to help their friend, their reasons are alienating, which I donât find convincing. My point was precisely that because the standard is so high for a consequentialist, itâs all the more flattering if your friend prioritizes you in light of that standard. Itâs quite difficult to reconcile with my revealed priorities as someone who definitely doesnât live up to my own consequentialism, yes, but I bite the bullet that this is really just a failure on my part (or, as you mention, the âinstrumentalâ reasons to be a good friend also win over anyway).
Hm, to my ear, prioritizing a friend just because you happen to be biased towards them is more circumstantial. Itâs based on accidents of geography and life events that led you to be friends with that person to a greater degree than with other people youâve never met.
Thatâs a good point. I think one plausible-sounding response is that while the friendship itself was started largely circumstantially, the reason you maintain and continue to value the relationship is not so circumstantial, and has more to do with your actual relationship with that other person.
Itâs quite difficult to reconcile with my revealed priorities as someone who definitely doesnât live up to my own consequentialism, yes, but I bite the bullet that this is really just a failure on my part (or, as you mention, the âinstrumentalâ reasons to be a good friend also win over anyway).
If you do think it is a failure on your part, then belief that itâs the best thing you could be doing isnât the reason, and isnât one reason actually special concern for your friend or your relationship with them? I suppose the point is that you donât recognize that reason as an ethical one; itâs just something that happens to explain your behaviour in practice, not what you think is right.
the reason you maintain and continue to value the relationship is not so circumstantial, and has more to do with your actual relationship with that other person
Right, but even so it seems like a friend who cares for you because they believe caring for you is good, and better than the alternatives, is âwarmerâ than one who doesnât think this but merely follows some partiality (or again, bias) toward you.
I suppose it comes down to conflicting intuitions on something like âunconditional love.â Several people, not just hardcore consequentialists, find that concept hollow and cheap, because loving someone unconditionally implies you donât really care who they are, in any sense other than the physical continuity of their identity. Conditional love identifies the aspects of the person actually worth loving, and that seems more genuine to me, though less comforting to someone who wants (selfishly) to be loved no matter what they do.
I suppose the point is that you donât recognize that reason as an ethical one; itâs just something that happens to explain your behaviour in practice, not what you think is right.
Yeah, exactly. It would be an extremely convenient coincidence if our feelings for partial friendship etc., which evolved in small communities where these feelings were largely sufficient for social cohesion, just happened to be the ethically best things for us to follow - when we now live in a world where itâs feasible for someone to do a lot more good by being impartial.
Edit: seems based on one of your other comments that we actually agree more than I thought.
Hm, to my ear, prioritizing a friend just because you happen to be biased towards them is more circumstantial. Itâs based on accidents of geography and life events that led you to be friends with that person to a greater degree than with other people youâve never met.
I agree, though thatâs a separate argument. I was addressing the claim that conditional on a consequentialist choosing to help their friend, their reasons are alienating, which I donât find convincing. My point was precisely that because the standard is so high for a consequentialist, itâs all the more flattering if your friend prioritizes you in light of that standard. Itâs quite difficult to reconcile with my revealed priorities as someone who definitely doesnât live up to my own consequentialism, yes, but I bite the bullet that this is really just a failure on my part (or, as you mention, the âinstrumentalâ reasons to be a good friend also win over anyway).
Thatâs a good point. I think one plausible-sounding response is that while the friendship itself was started largely circumstantially, the reason you maintain and continue to value the relationship is not so circumstantial, and has more to do with your actual relationship with that other person.
If you do think it is a failure on your part, then belief that itâs the best thing you could be doing isnât the reason, and isnât one reason actually special concern for your friend or your relationship with them? I suppose the point is that you donât recognize that reason as an ethical one; itâs just something that happens to explain your behaviour in practice, not what you think is right.
Right, but even so it seems like a friend who cares for you because they believe caring for you is good, and better than the alternatives, is âwarmerâ than one who doesnât think this but merely follows some partiality (or again, bias) toward you.
I suppose it comes down to conflicting intuitions on something like âunconditional love.â Several people, not just hardcore consequentialists, find that concept hollow and cheap, because loving someone unconditionally implies you donât really care who they are, in any sense other than the physical continuity of their identity. Conditional love identifies the aspects of the person actually worth loving, and that seems more genuine to me, though less comforting to someone who wants (selfishly) to be loved no matter what they do.
Yeah, exactly. It would be an extremely convenient coincidence if our feelings for partial friendship etc., which evolved in small communities where these feelings were largely sufficient for social cohesion, just happened to be the ethically best things for us to follow - when we now live in a world where itâs feasible for someone to do a lot more good by being impartial.
Edit: seems based on one of your other comments that we actually agree more than I thought.